FMSF NEWSLETTER ARCHIVE - FMSF Newsletter - September 1, 1997 - Vol. 6, No. 8, HTML version

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ISSN #1069-0484.           Copyright (c) 1997  by  the  FMS Foundation
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  FMS News
         Legal Corner
             Make a Difference
               Lindsay, T., Feld
                 From Our Readers
                   Bulletin Board

Dear Friends,

  "The dam has broken!" That's what Merci, a member of our legal team,
said as she worked on the summaries for this issue. We don't know if a
dam has broken. We do know that since the Foundation began in March of
1992 we have never had so much pertinent positive news to report. It
will take several months to discuss all that has appeared this summer
in the legal, research and literary areas. This month we focus on
legal cases and why understanding them is important to us all.
  There are 7 appellate-level opinions described in this issue
starting, with the long-awaited New Hampshire Hungerford appeal that
upholds the 1995 decision of Judge Groff in the circuit court: "the
phenomenon of 'memory repression' ... is not generally accepted as
valid and reliable by a respectable majority of the pertinent
scientific community..." We report on two types of appellate cases:
those such as the New Hampshire decision in which the focus is on the
issue of whether recovered/repressed memory testimony meets the
standard of evidence to be allowed in the courts; and those in which
the issue is the extension of the statute of limitations for filing a
recovered/ repressed memory case. All the reported decisions are
consistent with the Foundation's position.
  When a lawsuit is initiated, if it is not dropped, dismissed or
settled, the first legal decision is at a "trial" level court. A
decision at the trial level does not set precedent, although it may
have an impact on the way similar cases are handled in the future. It
is only when a trial decision is appealed and a judgment is entered at
the appellate level that a decision becomes a guide for other courts
in that jurisdiction. When the professional organizations fail to
monitor themselves and when there is no government agency that can
adequately protect mental health consumers, the courts become the tool
of balance. The rulings in the current appellate courts are highly
significant for all affected families whether they are directly
involved in legal actions or not. These opinions will ultimately
affect the direction and speed with which the recovered/repressed
memory controversy fades as a major mental health issue.
  A burgeoning type of legal action is that taken by formerly accused
persons who turn the tables and sue those who accused them. George
Franklin, whose daughter accused him of the alleged murder of Susan
Nason on the basis of recovered memories, has brought a lawsuit
against his daughter, her therapist, San Mateo CA prosecutors and
expert witness Lenore Terr, M.D. for conspiring to wrongfully
prosecute him. In this issue we also report on the first settlement,
to our knowledge, of a family's action brought against the lawyer who
represented their daughter in a lawsuit against them. Their daughter
has not retracted. In another legal direction, third-party standing
to bring lawsuits is the issue in two on-going cases described in the
legal section. The results of these cases may affect the possibility
of future similar litigation.
  On August 15, 1997 a Texas jury awarded former patient Lynn Carl
$5.8 million. As a result of the therapy she received from
psychiatrist Gloria Keraga, M.D., Carl's whole family came to believe
that Carl had practiced murder, cannibalism, sexual abuse and incest.
Dallas attorney Skip Simpson, who represented Carl, argued that "This
case was all about creating victims so the mental health field could
have patients and expensive treatment." As described in the Houston
Chronicle, 8/16/97, Simpson noted that "therapists implanted false
memories that worsened Carl's condition so they could collect more
than $1.1 million in insurance."[1]
  The theme of psychiatric fraud was repeated this summer as Tenet
Healthcare (formerly National Medical Enterprises) agreed to pay $100
million to former psychiatric patients for, among other things,
providing unnecessary psychiatric treatment.[2] In 1996 alone,
Medicare fraud cost the United States $23 billion or $100 for each
person in our country.[3]
  The repressed memory controversy differs from these examples,
however, because it has gone several steps further than misusing
money. It branded an innocent segment of the population as criminals.
Beyond the harm done to those who received inappropriate, unscientific
and incompetent therapy, a large number of loving family members were
accused of criminal acts. An accusation of sexual abuse, even when
proven unfounded, carries a potential life-long stigma. Statute of
limitation laws were changed based on these ideas and the judicial
process has been contaminated by unscientific beliefs.
  Although there are many positive things happening that will
ultimately bring relief to families, the grim reality is that
thousands of families are still suffering the grief that comes with
the loss of a child. The grim reality is that an increasing number of
accusers are going to have to live the rest of their lives without
closure because the parents they accused are dead. The grim reality is
that the Souzas are still under house arrest and Bruce Perkins is
still behind bars because of claims of recovered repressed memories.
Gerald Amirault and too many others are still in prison-victims of
day-care sex hysteria.
  The growth of the recovered/repressed memory movement has been
stopped; the number of new lawsuits against parents based only on
recovered/repressed memories is negligible; and as an understanding of
the phenomenon has been achieved, the work of the Foundation is
shifting. We are increasingly called upon to help families in their
struggle to reconcile, to assist former patients and to help all
parties in their efforts to hold those who have harmed them
accountable -- damage control and mopping up. What is happening in the
legal area now is critical to how the mopping up will proceed. It is
unfortunate that professional issues are finding resolution through
the courts because that brings a high social cost. However as Klerman
noted in 1990, "The courts may be an appropriate arena for litigation
when a small minority of the profession persist in practices that
scientific evidence and professional judgment have deemed

 1. Mark Smith, "Jury awards $5.8 million in satanic memories case,"
Houston Chronicle, August 16, 1997. (We will include a full analysis
of the Carl case in the October newsletter.)
 2. Jo Ann Zuniga, "Tenet agrees to $100 million settlement: Firm
accused of imprisoning patients, Houston Chronicle, July 30, 1997..
 3. "Medicare wastes billions as inept management rules, "US A Today,
July 21, 1997
 4. Klerman, Gerald (1990) The psychiatric patient's right to
effective treatment: Implications of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge. Am J
Psychiatry 147:4, 409-418, April.

 /                                                                 \ 
 | The intellectual battle may not be over yet, but the repressed  |
 | memory forces are in full retreat. Scientific skepticism of the |
 | supposed phenomenon has never been higher, courts are belatedly |
 | taking long, critical looks at "recovered" memories of alleged  |
 | childhood abuse, and the public at large has moved beyond       |
 | unquestioning acceptance of such claims.                        |
 |                                 The Plain Dealer, July 13, 1997 |
 |                          Joe Dirck, Review of Spectral Evidence |

                            F M S  N E W S
                         First Major FMS Play
       Alastair Macauley, The Financial Times, August 16, 1997.
In Britain, "Anna Weiss" by Mike Cullen has been receiving rave
reviews. An example from the August 16 Financial Times described the
play as "a riveting, even occasionally funny, play about that
currently hot potato-memory of child abuse allegedly recovered under
                           First FMS Novel
The first FMS novel, to our knowledge, is entitled "Try to Remember"
by Zane Kotker (Random House). Early comments indicate that its
strength is its insight into the ease with which a person may be open
to and even seek out influence leading to false memories. The story is
about a family in which one of two daughters develops false
memories. This book will be reviewed in a future Newsletter.
                 Headline in August, 1997 APA Monitor
        "WWII veterans provide evidence of repressed memories"
The article on which the headline is based is "Repressed Memories and
World War II: Lest We Forget!" by Bertram Karon and Anmarie Widener,
Professional Psychology: Research and Practice,V28 (4) pp 338-340. It
describes a case study done 20 years ago by the author's brother.
  Editor's Comment: Most scientists reject a case study or even many
case studies as "evidence" of the sort implied in the headline. An
excellent description of the reasons for this can be found in Harrison
Pope's, Psychology Astray: Fallacies in Studies of "Repressed Memory"
and Childhood Trauma.
                         Videotaped Discovery 
      of a Reportedly Unrecallable Memory of Child Sexual Abuse:
  Comparison With a Childhood Interview Videotaped 11 Years Before.
                     D. L. Corwin and E. Olafson  
            Child Maltreatment, Vol 2 (2) May 1997, 91-112
Hailed by some as evidence of recovery of a repressed or traumatic memory,
this case study places the complex issue of corroboration in the limelight
and raises some ethical issues. Presented are transcripts of interviews
done by Corwin with Jane Doe at ages 6 and 17. He interviewed Jane at age 6
in the context of a legal/custody case in which the father claimed the
mother had sexually and physically abused the child. Before Corwin's first
interview, Jane told of the abuse in interviews by both a police
investigator and her therapist. Corwin's initial interview supported Jane's
sexual abuse allegation. Interviewed at age 17, Jane was renewing a
relationship with her mother and appeared to have forgotten her earlier
claims of abuse. When asked directly about the earlier accusations, Jane
did remember. Corwin remarks that she was aware that she was about to be
shown a videotape of the earlier interview.
  A number of professionals were asked to comment on these tapes. Paul
Ekman, for example, analyzes Jane's eye closures noting "I suspect
these long closures are signs that she continues to repress some of
the memories of what happened to her as a child. I have found long eye
closures such as these within clinical cases where repression is
occurring and in deliberate lies with normal subjects." Frank Putnam
suggests that the interviews were a model of technique for forensic
interviews of young children. D. Stephen Lindsay questions this and
provides examples of Corwin asking leading questions.
  Ulric Neisser is cautious about what can be concluded from the
tapes, noting that comparisons of statements in the earlier and later
interviews show that Jane's first recovered memory is entirely false
and the second is "substantially misleading." He writes that "It is
never a good idea to jump to conclusions where memory is concerned."
Lindsay raises the ethical concern of "seeking out the subjects of
such interviews and revisiting their content." Was Jane able to
continue the process of reconnecting with her mother after the
interview at age 17?
  Notably missing from any part of this discussion is the accused
mother. Why was she not also interviewed? Newsletter readers may also
wonder what happened in the interviews before Jane spoke to Corwin?
This article and comments show the complexity of the concerns of
corroboration and ethics in these cases.
     $100 Million Settlement for 700 Former Psychiatric Patients
                    New York Times, July 30, 1997
In 1994 National Medical Enterprises' psychiatric subsidiary pleaded
guilty to Federal conspiracy charges for paying kickbacks and bribes
to doctors between 1986 and 1991. At that time, NME paid about $375
million in fines and penalties. The company sold its psychiatric
hospitals to Tenet Healthcare Corporation.
  In July, 1997 Tenet Healthcare Corporation has paid about $85
million to settle 620 patient cases filed in Conroe, Texas and about
$12 million to settle about 60 cases brought in Forth Worth. In
addition, the doctors who were involved in these cases have agreed to
pay $20 million in compensation to the patients. There are about 300
similar cases outstanding. The former patients said that they had been
admitted to the hospitals for their insurance. Indeed, they said that
they were rarely released until their insurance benefits were used up.
They claimed they did not receive appropriate care and were sometimes
put in restraints. Some complained that they were not permitted to get
in touch with family members or make telephone calls.
  According to the NY Times report, the case of one child exemplified
many others. "After his parents' divorce, Matthew, then 8 years old,
began to experience behavioral problems. A social worker with a
business relationship with a doctor associated with National Medical
encouraged his mother to admit Matthew to the hospital. When the boy
resisted, he was threatened with being placed in a straitjacket and
was physically restrained. While his mother was assured that he only
needed hospitalization for a few days, Matthew, who was not examined
by a doctor before his admission, was kept a total of 61 days. When he
was released, he had no insurance benefits left."
         Audit of Medicare Finds $23 Billion in Overpayments
                    New York Times, July 17, 1997
         Medicare wastes billions in inept management rules.
                       USA Today, July 21, 1997
The first comprehensive audit of Medicare federal auditors said that
the government had overpaid hospitals, doctors and other health care
providers last year by 14% -- or $23 billion -- one out of every $7.
According to the report in USA Today, that amounts to $100 a year for
every person in the country. The report noted, among other things,
that payments were recorded as improper when medical records did not
show a need for the services provided.
                   Ontario Health Department Study
                           MacMillan et al
   "Prevalence of Child Physical and Sexual Abuse in the Community"
                      JAMA, 7/9, 1997 V 278 (7)
Results of a study based on data from 13,002 Ontario households in the
general population showed a prevalence rate of sexual abuse for
females of about 13%. What was striking in the study is that adults
who were unrelated by either blood or marriage were most often
identified as sexual abusers. The common belief has been that parents
and step-parents are usually perpetrators of sexual abuse. "Some other
persons were most often indicated as perpetrators of sexual abuse
followed by other relatives across age categories." (p 134)
Limitations of the study are that it was self-report, retrospective,
and the time included as childhood was vague.
        Mere Memory Testing Creates False Memories in Children
                     C.J. Brainerd and V.F. Reyna
         Developmental Psychology 1996 Vol 32, No 3, 467-478.
Although it has been reported that initial recall tests inoculate true
memories against forgetting without creating false memories, this is
not the case for recognition tests. In two experiments with 5- and 8-
year-olds, initial recognition tests elevated children's false-memory
responses.              ______________________
                        You Must Remember This
                            Sandra Martin
                      Chatelaine, September 1997
Chatelaine is the first Canadian magazine to explore the recovered
memory controversy in depth. Sandra Martin does this by focusing on
one family that exemplifies "... the many human casualties in the
bloodiest gender war of the century." The following excerpt from the
concluding paragraph of the article provides insight into the status
of the controversy at this point in time.
  "Recovered memory therapy is different: it works with memories as
though they are facts, and seeks resolution in part through blaming
and confrontation. In researching this article I consulted several
psychiatrists and therapists. None of them, including a crisis
intervention social worker and a psychotherapist who have participated
in family confrontations in the past, now recommends to their patients
that they act on the memories that are reconstructed in the therapy

                        NOTES FROM NEW ZEALAND
                    Felicity Goodyear-Smith, M.D.

I first began to work in the sexual abuse field in the early 1980s
when, as a family physician, I was appointed as a Police Doctor
specializing in sexual assault forensic examinations. I became active
in training doctors and other professionals in this field;
administering a sexual assault medical and counselling centre; and
assisting in the preparation of professional guidelines for
investigation and management of sexual assault. By the mid 1980s I
had become concerned that some of our cases were based on false
allegations, especially when it was a concerned adult who believed a
child was being abused, even though the child denied it. This was
worrying in the context of disputes over custody when parents had
  A belief that false allegations did not happen colored how some
professionals approached these cases. When I expressed my concerns to
my colleagues, the response astounded me -- I was accused of denying
sexual abuse, and colluding with offenders. Doors slammed and I became
a pariah in many clinical circles. I began to research the area of
children's testimony and the nature of memory; I learned how easily
memories can be distorted or even created by suggestion; and I
contacted experts in other countries with concerns similar to mine. I
realized that this problem had stemmed from the United States and that
we had misguidedly imported a lot of misinformation.
  After my attempts to disseminate information about memory and false
allegations failed, in 1993 I published what I had learned in a book,
First Do No Harm: the Sexual Abuse Industry. Shortly thereafter, I
started to access papers about the "False Memory Syndrome" and learned
about the FMS organization and its incredible growth during its first
two years of existence.
  There was a steady flow of families contacting me with tragic
stories of their children removed from their care by social services
acting on faulty sexual abuse "indicators" (such as girls with hymen
openings over 4 mm, now accepted as normal), and men being denied
access to their children when false sexual allegations were made in
the context of acrimonious custody disputes.
  At the end of 1993, I suddenly began to hear from families
throughout New Zealand where allegations were being made, usually by
an adult daughter who had recalled during therapy that she had been
horribly sexually abused as a child. Over the next twelve months I
heard from more than 100 families with these sorts of stories. This
may seem very few relative to the 1,400 plus families who contacted
FMSF in its first year, but it should be appreciated that ours is a
small country, with a total population of less than four million.
There were no services available at all for these people. Because
there was nowhere to send them, I set up, with the help of others, our
national organization COSA (Casualties of Sexual Allegations Inc.).
COSA is the NZ equivalent of the FMSF, but our scope is broader,
dealing with the effects of false sexual allegations arising in any
context. Membership includes those who claim false sexual allegations
of any nature, their families and supporters; and concerned
professionals and members of the public. We also have had a few
retractors make contact. Some men have written from prison, convicted
on the basis of recovered memories of their daughters and other
relatives, whose defence had never addressed the issue of the
potential unreliability of memories "recovered" in therapy using
hypnosis or similar techniques. A number of our members were facing
BU}9criminal charges.
  During 1994 and 1995 the media ran some very responsible stories
about the potential problem of memories recalled during therapy, and
expert witnesses for the defence were able to testify about the memory
repression and recovery debate. There were several high-profile cases
involving COSA members who were acquitted of all charges, and it is
now unlikely that the police would bring charges where the testimony
of the complainant can be shown to be based on "recovered memories."
  In late 1994 I was awarded a Fellowship enabling me to attend the
Johns Hopkins/FMSF conference "Memory/Reality: Reconciliation." One of
the conditions of my Fellowship was to present the conference
findings at post-graduate medical meetings throughout New Zealand the
following year. However, a highly influential and wealthy group,
Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care (DSAC), sent letters to all the Post-
Graduate Medical Societies, Law Societies and a number of other
institutions and organizations, urging them not to allow me to address
their members. They objected that my "views on memory and sexual abuse
are strongly influenced by the False Memory Syndrome Foundation" which
they claimed "advances a very polarized position on memory and
significant emotional trauma." As a result, most of my speaking
engagements were cancelled.
  Over the past few years, Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care (DSAC) and
the New Zealand Psychological Society have actively campaigned to have
me deregistered as a doctor and to prevent my publishing and lecturing
in this field. When DSAC was first set up, I was made an honorary life
member in recognition of my pioneer work. However in the intervening
years, there has been an increasing divergence between DSAC's
perspective and my own. DSAC has promoted the belief that false
allegations are extremely rare (in 1993 their president reported that
she had "never known a false allegation get through") and that all
complaints should be treated as genuine. Over the past few years they
have sponsored a stream of international speakers to New Zealand to
teach professionals. These include Roland Summit, John Briere, John
Conte, Judith Herman, Arno Bentovim, Bessel van der Kolk, and
Christine Courtois. Academics and clinicians who challenge the use of
memory recovery techniques and the validity of "recovered memories"
have been conspicuous by their absence.
  Despite DSAC, there has been considerable shift in the last year or
two. Public awareness has been raised regarding the way both adults
and children can make false allegations, and understanding how
susceptible our memories are to the influences of suggestion. This
knowledge has also spilled over to professionals in the field.
Professional bodies are developing guidelines with respect to
recovered memories. I think that the "recovered memory" phenomenon has
peaked. We are not out of the woods yet. We are seeing a growing
number of cases where a woman initially has said she has recovered a
memory of childhood molestation, but later claims that actually she
has always remembered the abuse. Given the powerful, vivid and
emotionally loaded quality of recovered memories, it is not surprising
for a woman to be astounded that she could have forgotten such trauma,
and convince herself that somewhere deep down she always really
remembered it.
  This was clearly demonstrated in one of the "recovered memory"
trials in 1994. The defendant's daughter testified that she had always
remembered her abuse. Her psychologist had shredded her counselling
notes prior to the trial, but she testified that her client had always
remembered her abuse. However, in her initial police statement the
daughter was recorded as saying that she had first remembered the
abuse during the course of her therapy.
 In the last few years, a number of other cases have come to our
attention where the initial allegation was said to be based on a
recovered memory, but a year or two later the complainant now says
that this is a memory she has always had. Whether a memory is reported
to be continuous or recovered, in the absence of corroboration there
is no way to establish whether it represents a real or a fictitious
event. Complainants are less likely to say that they had always
remembered the abuse in the United States, because a Statute of
Limitations allows law suits relating to alleged long ago events on
the basis that the Statute starts from the time the "memory" was
exhumed. Someone who claims she always remembered the abuse therefore
cannot take legal action against the accused. Because New Zealand does
not have a Statute of Limitations, all that is required is for the
complainant who first makes her allegations during psychotherapy to
say that somewhere she always really remembered it. Therapists now
talk about "enhancing" rather than "recovering" memories.
  COSA has had relatively few contacts this year where "recovered
memory" is clearly identified as the basis for an allegation, and it
seems that mental health professionals are far more aware of the
potential danger of recovered memory techniques. However, a belief
that one in three girls have been sexually abused, and that a vast
array of problems and symptoms are caused by childhood sexual abuse,
still means that mental health professionals have it "top of their
list" and are actively looking for sexual abuse histories and
uncritically believing clients who say they are sexual abuse
survivors. We may be over the worst of the problem, but we still have
a way to go.

  Felicity Goodyear-Smith, M.D.,Hon Research Fellow,Dept of Psychiatry
  & Behavioural Sci.,U of Auckland

                       Michele Gregg, MSW, ACSW

I recently attended the VOICES In Action Conference "From Fear to
Freedom" (July 24-27, 1997) in San Francisco. VOICES In Action,
Inc. is an international organization which represents incest and
sexual abuse survivors and their supporters. Among the special
interest groups listed in the VOICES newsletter are those for
survivors with dissociative disorders and with difficulty in retrieval
of memories. Participants at this conference included survivors and
their partners, therapists and therapist-survivors.
  My interest in attending the conference came from both my
professional experience as a social worker in the department of CPS
and my personal experience as a sister of an accuser. One of the
consequence of my sister's recovered memory therapy was a
  The VOICES Pre-Conference Institute Day began with a discouraging
reminder that the recovered memory controversy has become all too
personal. For example, author and expert witness Jon Conte, Ph.D. in
his workshop "Managing Memory in Psychotherapy," said that memory
researcher Elizabeth Loftus, Ph.D. "grossly misstates science" and
that it is all he can do to "keep from slashing the tires of her car"
when he sees it parked at the University of Washington.
  Approximately 80 people attended the keynote speech given by Beverly
Engel, MFCC, author of Divorcing a Parent. In her book, Ms Engel
provides a sample "Declaration of Divorce" stating "... one-fourth to
one-half of all adult children from dysfunctional families choose to
divorce one or both parents."[1] In her talk, she mentioned divorcing
her own mother and about her appearance on "Phil Donahue" discussing
the need to divorce parents with her clients. However, she also noted
some positive outcomes of the "backlash" such as awareness that some
therapists overly influence their clients and that too many hospitals
developed sex abuse units only "cash in" on the profits of the
survivor movement.
  Ms. Engel indicated that both she and Laura Davis [2] have reached a
point in their lives where they feel they no longer have to "focus on
incest" and that they are "ready to move on." Engel also said she now
realizes that her previous focus on sex abuse hampered her own
personal growth. She further stated that she has "rediscovered
spirituality" and her identification includes artist and nature lover.
  Some VOICES workshops likewise echoed this theme of "moving on." For
exampe, in his workshop "Frozen in Time: Solution Oriented Methods for
Resolving Sexual Abuse" Bill O'Hanlon, MS, presented alternatives to
"reliving the trauma." Some of the participants in this lively and
well-attended workshop complained about therapists who insisted that
they continue to deal with the past. Mr. O'Hanlon explained that Freud
is to blame for those therapists who practice "trauma drama" and see
moving on as denial. Instead, he presented pragmatic suggestions for
handling compulsive behaviors and obsessive thinking.
  Another present/future-oriented workshop was Mary Catherine Arango's
"The Fine Art of Self-Sabbotage." Participants seemed especially
attentive to Ms. Arango talk concerning basic concepts of personal
finances. Many of the questions and comments indicated that these
participants may have serious problems in this area. Ms. Arango
disclosed that she had emotionally abused her own daughter and told
how she dealt with her problem. The participants seemed engrossed in
Ms. Arango's personal narrative.
  In the silence following Ms. Arango's account, my mind raced. In
this self-absorbing, self-promoting culture of survivors, what has
been happening to their own children? Have these survivors been
abusing or neglecting their own children? Given the current cultural
penchant of demonizing parents, would any parent seek help in such a
climate? And, are therapists screening this population (survivors) for
abuse or for deficient parenting skills? What is going to be the long-
term impact of inappropriate cut-offs from supportive grandparents,
aunts and uncles?
  At a workshop entitled "Dissociation: The Daily Struggle for
Freedom" with Caryn StarDancer and Lynette Danylchuk, the energy level
among participants seemed noticably low. This workshop seemed to
attract participants who were self-disclosed multiples. Many appeared
pale and to have vacant looks.
  I came away from the conference convinced that other professionals
would also benefit from attending similar meetings. By gaining insight
into the survivor's perspective, professionals may better understand
the issues involved in the controversy, and, more important, what
needs to be done to solve the myriad problems that lie in the wake of
the recovered memory movement.

 1. Engel, B. (1991) Divorcing a Parent. New York: Ballantine
Books. p.1
 2. Laura Davis, coauthor of The Courage to Heal (1988) with Ellen

  Michele Gregg is a volunteer researcher for the FMSF Newsletter.

    |                       SPECIAL THANKS                       |
    |                                                            |
    |       We extend a very special "Thank you" to all of       |
    |      the people who help prepare the FMSF Newsletter.      |  
    |                                                            |
    |   EDITORIAL SUPPORT: Toby Feld, Allen Feld,                |
    |                           Howard Fishman, Peter Freyd      |
    |   RESEARCH: Merci Federici, Michele Gregg, Anita Lipton    |
    |   NOTICES and PRODUCTION: Ric Powell                       |
    |   COLUMNISTS: Katie Spanuello and                          |
    |       members of the FMSF Scientific Advisory Board        |
    |   LETTERS and INFORMATION: Our Readers                     |

                       L E G A L   C O R N E R
                              FMSF Staff

                      APPELLATE-LEVEL DECISIONS
                  New Hampshire Supreme Court Rules
                Repressed Memory Testimony Unreliable
 State of New Hampshire v. Hungerford / Morahan, 1995 WL 378571 (N.H.
Super. Ct. May 23, 1995), aff'd, 1997 WL 358620 (N.H. July 1, 1997)[1]
  In a much-anticipated decision, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's ruling that the repressed memory testimony
presented in these two criminal cases was not sufficiently reliable to
be admissible as evidence. The ruling affirmed Superior Court Justice
William J. Groff's May 1995 decision which, following two-week long
admissibility hearings and a thorough factual review, concluded in a
35-page decree that the phenomenon of memory repression and the
process of therapy used to recover the memories have not gained
general acceptance in the field of psychology and are not
scientifically reliable under either a Frye or Daubert analysis.[2]
  The court addressed the State's argument on appeal: 1) that the
trial court erred in requiring a preliminary showing of reliability or
general acceptance before the witnesses' testimony would be admitted;
and 2) that, assuming the preliminary showing was required, the trial
court erred in concluding that the State failed to make such a
  The court disagreed with the State's contention that repressing and
retrieving memories are normal human functions and that such evidence
is not beyond the average juror's ability to comprehend. Citing the
division within the psychological community on the issue of memory
repression, the court concluded that ordinary jurors could not be
expected to analyze such claims without the assistance of experts. The
court held that the trial court correctly ordered a pretrial hearing
on admissibility and properly ordered that the State bore the burden
to present expert testimony to explain such evidence.
  Following a review of case law from other jurisdictions and relevant
psychological literature, the court concluded that the admissibility
of refreshed recollection should be approached on a case-by-case
basis, tempered with skepticism. The court further expressed concern
about the influence of therapy on recovery of memory, stating, "[W]e
do not mean to suggest that all or even a majority of recovered
repressed memories are 'false.' Rather, we merely recognize that
memories are subject to many factors that may affect their
reliability, especially, as the trial court found in the instant
cases, the uniquely suggestive environment of psychological therapy."
  In order to determine the reliability of a recovered memory, the
court listed an eight-pronged test for trial courts to follow before
such evidence may be allowed: 1) the level of peer review and
publication on the phenomenon of repression and recovery of memories;
2) whether the phenomenon has been generally accepted in the
psychological community; 3) whether the phenomenon may be and has been
empirically tested; 4) the potential or known rate of recovered
memories that are false; 5) the age of the witness at the time the
event or events occurred; 6) the length of time between the event and
the recovery of the memory; 7) the presence or absence of objective,
verifiable, corroborative evidence of the event; and 8) the
circumstances attendant to the witnesses' recovery of the memory,
i.e., whether the witness was engaged in therapy or some other process
seeking to recover memories or likely to result in recovered memories
[citations omitted].
  Applying the above criteria to the cases before it, the court
concluded, inter alia, that the phenomenon of repressed memories has
not gained general acceptance in the psychological community.
(Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594). Although the court did not find the
second element conclusive of admissibility alone, it did find that the
phenomenon had not reached the point where these particular memories
could be found reliable. However, in conclusion, the court stated, "in
a particular case, the court may be satisfied with the state of the
scientific debate on the question of recovering repressed memories and
with the general indicators of reliability surrounding a particular
recovered memory. If that memory is recovered in the context of
therapy, however, we still will be greatly concerned with the
suggestiveness of the therapeutic process, and its ability to skew
memory and one's confidence in memory [citations omitted]."
  On July 18, 1997, Assistant Hillsborough County Attorney Marguerite
Wageling dropped charges against defendant Joel Hungerford, and
earlier in the week Assistant County Attorney John B. Weld dismissed
charges against John Morahan. The two defendants applauded the high
court ruling, saying that the false accusations put their lives on
hold for five years, cost them close to $100,000 each and severely
damaged their reputations.[3] The New Hampshire ruling has already
been cited favorably by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in the
matter Barrett v. Hyldburg and applied to another criminal case
involving repressed memory testimony before the same court in State of
New Hamsphire v. Walters (reported elsewhere in this Newsletter).

 1. See FMSF Publication No. 809 (FMSF Amicus Curiae brief filed on
behalf of defendants/appellees); FMSF Publication No. 827 (transcripts
of expert testimony at admissibility hearings held March 27-April 7,
1995); and FMSF Brief Bank No. 10.
 2. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) [whether
theory has gained general acceptance in relevant scientific
community]; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct.
2786 (1993) [criteria determining soundness of scientific evidence
sought to be introduced includes whether the theory 1) has been
tested; 2) subjected to peer review and publication; 3) has a known
rate of error; 4) has gained general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community].
 3. West, Nancy, "Ruling doesn't end debate over repressed memory,"
The Union Leader (Manchester, NH), July 20, 1997, Section A, p. 1.
      Repressed Memory Evidence Ruled Inadmissible in California
Engstrom v. Engstrom, in the Court of Appeal of the State of
California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, B098146 [1] (June
18, 1997).
  In an unpublished opinion, a California Court of Appeal affirmed the
Superior Court's judgment of non-suit, finding that the trial court
properly held that the standard of admissibility of evidence under
Kelly-Frye [2] had not been met and that plaintiff was rightly
precluded from testifying to any recovered repressed memories.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that "the
phenomenon of 'memory repression' ... is not generally accepted as
valid and reliable by a respectable majority of the pertinent
scientific community and ... the techniques and procedures utilized in
the retrieval process have not gained general acceptance in the field
of psychology or psychiatry." However, the court indicated that if any
memories of childhood sexual abuse were not generated during therapy,
he could still appear as a witness. Since appellant had no such
memories and lacked evidence of abuse from any other source, the trial
court granted non-suit.
  The Court of Appeal concurred with the lower court's finding,
stating: "[a]s the evidence below made clear, whether or not one
ascribes to what the trial court denominated "the phenomenon of
'repressed memories,' it is generally agreed there is no way, in the
absence of independent corroboration, which was absent here, to
ascertain whether a person whose memory has been revived through a
process of therapy such as guided imagery is relating actual facts or
  Further, the Court of Appeal disagreed with appellant's argument
that California Civil Code of Procedure, childhood sexual abuse
statute, Section 340.1 should be interpreted as "manifesting an intent
by the state Legislature to embrace the concept of repressed memory as
valid evidence." The court stated that "Section 340.1 has nothing to
do with the admissibility or competency of evidence related to 'the
phenomenon of repressed memories.' It is a statute of limitations
  On July 28, 1997, appellant petitioned the California Supreme Court
for review [3] to "resolve the important questions of California Law
concerning the applicability of testimony of alleged survivors of
childhood sexual abuse of the Kelly-Frye Rule, People v. Shirley [4]
and CCP 340.1."[5]

 1. See, FMSF Publication No. 810, FMSF Amicus Curiae Brief filed on
behalf of defendant/appellee; Also, see FMSF Brief Bank No. 63; FMSF
Newsletter, October, 1995.
 2. People v. Kelly (1976), 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
 3. Engstrom v. Engstrom, in the Supreme Court of the State of
California, 2 Civil No. B098146, "Petition for Review from the
Superior Court of Los Angeles."
 4. Appellant's petition asks the court to review whether the Kelly-
Frye Rule should be extended past People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d
18 to include all non-hypnotic therapy and guided imagery therapy.
 5. Appellant's petition further asks the court to review whether the
legislature's extension of the statute of limitations for adult
survivors of childhood abuse is a recognition that the judicially
created Kelly-Frye Rule does not apply to recovered memories of such
abuse in a cause of action under CCP 340.1.
     North Carolina Court of Appeals Rules to Exclude Evidence of 
     Memory Repression Absent Expert Testimony on the Phenomenon
    Barret v. Hyldburg, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1997 WL 434876 (N.C.App.))
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, recognizing that plaintiff's
appeal of the trial court's grant of defendant's motion in limine [1]
was premature, nevertheless elected in its discretion to affirm the
lower court's finding on the single issue presented, i.e., plaintiff's
testimony as to her allegedly repressed memories was precluded absent
accompanying expert testimony, explaining to the jury the phenomenon
of memory repression. The court, citing the Hungerford decision,
stated: "A New Hampshire court has spoken on the subject with
precision: ... [T]o argue that a jury could consider such a
phenomenon, evaluate it and draw conclusions as to its accuracy or
credibility without the aid of expert testimony is disingenuous to say
the least."
  In addition, the appellate court noted that there was a second
determination contained in the trial court's detailed Memorandum and
Order dated February 26, 1996 which was not presented by plaintiff on
appeal, to wit: even if plaintiff were to proffer expert testimony
regarding the phenomenon of memory repression, such testimony would be
excluded because of the lack of scientific assurance of the
reliability of repressed memory as an indicator of what actually
transpired in the past. The court noted, however, that this second
issue was not raised by plaintiff and, in addition, was premature
because it was an appeal of an interlocutory [interim] judgment, was
subject to change at trial and did not fit statutory requirements for
appeal prior to final judgment. Therefore, the court stated that it
would not rule on this issue until a final judgment had been rendered
and it was properly before the court on appeal.

 1. Motion in Limine. A motion used to exclude reference to
anticipated evidence claimed to be objectionable until the
admissibility of the questionable evidence can be determined either
before or during the trial by presenting to the court, out of the
presence of the jury, offers and objections to the evidence [citations
omitted]. The motion seeks to avoid injection into trial of
lirrelevant, inadmissible or prejudicial evidence at any point ... and
therefore prevents mistrials based on evidentiary irregularities.
Gifis, S.H., Law Dictionary (1991), Barron's Educational Series, Inc.:
New York.        ____________________________________
                 New Hampshire Supreme Court Revisits
   Admissibility of Repressed Memory Testimony after Hungerford [1]
  State of New Hampshire v. Walters, 1997 WL 937024 (N.H., August 6,
                          1997), slip copy.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling
which had allowed complainant's repressed memory testimony in a
criminal sexual assault trial. The complainant and her therapist
testified at an evidentiary hearing that she had three nightmares
during which she had "flashbacks" consisting of glimpses of her
stepfather abusing her when she was nine or ten years old. After
considering the record of the pretrial admissibility hearings in
Hungerford and following a brief hearing on the facts of the case, the
trial court ruled that the complainant's testimony was admissible and
that the testimony was not subject to the threshold reliability
requirements of expert testimony.
  The New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed two issues on appeal:
whether the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof on the
defendant to demonstrate the unreliability of recovered memories and
whether the court erred in ruling that the testimony was admissible.
Citing Hungerford, the court confirmed that the proponent of repressed
memory testimony must demonstrate that the testimony is reliable and
ruled that "the trial court erred in placing the burden on the
defendant to demonstrate that recovered memories are not reliable." In
addition, the court reiterated that recovered memories must satisfy
the eight-pronged admissibility test enunciated in Hungerford in order
to demonstrate that the testimony is reliable. Noting the difficulty
the defense would face in "cross-examining a dream to expose its
weaknesses or flaws," the court concluded by reiterating its ruling in
Hungerford, stating, "[t]he indicia of reliability present in the
particular memories in [this] case[] do not rise to such a level that
they overcome the divisive state of the scientific debate on the
issue" [citations omitted].

 1. State of New Hampshire v. Hungerford/Morahan, 1995 WL 378571
(N.H. Super Ct., May 23, 1995) aff'd. 1997 WL 358620 (N.H. July 1,
1997).         _______________________________________
               Mason, et al. v. Archdiocese of Detroit
         (Lawyers Weekly No. 29995) (unpublished per curiam)
(Taylor, Griffin and Saad, JJ). Michigan Lawyers Weekly, July 21, 1997
               Tort: Sexual Abuse -- No Repressed Memory
In an unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's finding that the statute of limitations had run in a
repressed memory suit. Plaintiff, 36 years old, sued defendants in
1994, alleging defendant priest sexually abused him when he was 12
years old. Plaintiff argued that he had repressed the memory of the
abuse until 1993. The Court of Appeals noted that there was sufficient
evidence to show that he did not repress the memory of the alleged
abuse and, therefore, the trial court properly found that the statute
of limitations had run.
   Texas Court Revisits Decade-Delayed Claim after S.V. v. R.V.[1]
          Marshall v. First Baptist Church of Houston, 1997
           WL 398859 (Tex. App. Hous. 14 Dist.), slip copy.
Plaintiff filed this negligence suit against the First Baptist Church
on January 6, 1994, alleging the Church was liable for a continuing
course of actionable conduct which included alleged sexual assault by
a music director when plaintiff was 12 years old and inaction by
Church officials after reporting the incident. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Church,
finding the claim time-barred by the applicable statute of
  Plaintiff raised seven points of error on appeal which the court
reduced to four basic arguments to avoid the limitations bar. This
article addresses only the first of these four points of error,[2]
i.e., whether the discovery rule should apply to defer the cause of
action. The court noted that the discovery rule applies in limited
situations where the wrongful act and resulting injury are inherently
undiscoverable at the time they occurred but may be objectively
verified. (S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 6). Plaintiff alleged that he did not
know that his psychological problems [3] were related to the acts of
the Church and, therefore, the inherent undiscoverable requirement of
the discovery rule should apply. The court disagreed, finding that the
evidence in the trial court showed that the plaintiff was clearly
aware of both the alleged wrongful acts and the injury and, therefore,
the inherently undiscoverable prong of the discovery rule was not
satisfied. The court stated, "[W]e will not expand it [the discovery
rule] to include those cases in which appellant is fully aware of the
act and the injury but failed to make the causal connection between
the two." Because the element of "inherently discoverability" was not
satisfied, the court was not required to address the second element of
whether the alleged act and resulting injury were objectively

 1. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1 (Tex., 1996). The Texas Supreme Court
held that in order to apply the discovery rule to any set of facts,
including repressed memory claims, the event and the injury must be
inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable. See full text of
decision dated March 14, 1996 (FMSF Publication No. 840) and FMSF
Amicus Curiae Brief filed in support of petitioner (FMSFPublication
No. 805).
 2. The court disagreed with the remaining arguments which included
claims that the Church's conduct constituted a continuing tort and
breach of contract and that Plaintiff''s mental incompetency should
have deferred accrual of his cause of action.
 3. Plaintiff began receiving counseling on July 23, 1990 and on
February 21, 1991, he was hospitalized for depression and anxiety
attacks. A psychiatrist diagnosed Plaintiff with Multiple Personality
Disorder and severe Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
   Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Statute of Limitations Bars Claims 
           of 7 Plaintiffs Alleging Sexual Abuse by Clergy.
         John BBB v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 565 N.W.2d 94 
                        (Wisc., June 27, 1997)
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently affirmed the circuit court's
dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints in seven consolidated cases
involving allegations of sexual abuse by four priests employed by the
Archdiocese of Milwaukee. Five of the plaintiffs claimed that they
only recently realized the psychological and emotional harm caused by
the alleged abuse (Type 1) and two of the plaintiffs claimed they
repressed the memory of the incidents and the identity of their
abusers (Type 2). The court, applying the discovery rule to these
cases, concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
  The court held that because the Legislature extended the statute of
limitations for claims of incest and sexual exploitation by a
therapist [1] and not for other types of sexual assault involving
minors, the complainants had two years of reaching adulthood to bring
a claim under Wisc. Stat. P 893.33. In addressing the two Type 2
repressed memory claims and after a review of case law in other
jurisdictions,[2] the court concluded that it would be contrary to
public policy, and would defeat the purposes of limitations statutes,
to allow claims of repressed memory to invoke the discovery rule to
indefinitely toll the statutory limitations. The court noted the
"valuable public policy goals served by statutes of limitations,
namely preserving a plaintiff's right to bring a claim juxtaposed with
a defendant's right to be free of stale and potentially fraudulent

 1. Wis. Stat. P 893.587 (1995-96) [Incest; limitation. An action
to recover damages for injury caused by incest shall be commenced
within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers the fact and the probable
cause, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the fact and the probable cause of the injury, whichever
occurs first.] and P 895.585 (1991-92) [Sexual exploitation by a
 2. Citing, inter alia, S.V. v. R.V. 933 S.W.2d 1 (1996) and Doe v.
Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087 (Md. 1996) cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).

                        TRIAL-LEVEL DECISIONS
    Court urges 'discovery rule' for repressed sex-abuse memories
               The New York Law Journal, July 21, 1997.
                  Pietro v. Wilkinson, Supreme Court
        Civil Suits for Queens County, New York, No. 02538295
                    The Hon. Frederick D. Schmidt
        (N.B. In NY the Supreme Court is a trial-level court)
Plaintiff brought a civil suit for alleged sexual abuse from ages 10
to 13. Plaintiff claimed that it was not until 1993 that she, through
therapy, was able to remember the alleged abuse. She also claimed that
she was so psychologically damaged that she was unable to commence
this action until 1995. The court ruled that it was constrained to
deem the action untimely but urged the Legislature to adopt a new
"discovery rule" for sex abuse cases.
  Editor's Note: An Act to amend the civil practice law and rules in
relation to extending the statute of limitations in New York for
certain sex offenses was introduced in the Senate on April 14, 1997
(S.B. 4477) but was not passed this year.[1] A report prepared by the
Committee on Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR 214) disapproved the
bill, noting that the supporting memorandum for the bill stated that
its purpose is "to recognize that children who are victims of sexual
abuse often suffer from repressed memory syndrome." The CPLR report
noted that the bill would defeat the "core" purpose of the statute of
limitations, i.e., "to avoid the litigation of stale claims after the
evidence is no longer reliable or even available, and to provide
certainty in human affairs by putting an end to latent claims"
[citations omitted]. The report further noted that "the sole rationale
for this dramatic change in the statute of limitations is the belief
that repressed memory syndrome is common among child victims of sexual
abuse. In fact, the theory of recovered memory itself is highly
controversial" [cites AMA Report of Council on Scientific Affairs,
adopted at 1994 AMA House of Delegates Annual Meeting].

 1. Similar bills have been introduced in New York but not passed in
previous years, e.g., 1995 S.B. 3522, 1996 S.B. 1624.

             Linda Bean v. Mark Peterson, Carol Peterson
          Cheshire County Superior Court, Case No. 95-E-0038
Linda Bean and her husband originally brought suit in 1995 against her
psychologist, Mark B. Peterson and his wife, certified social worker
Carol S. Peterson of Dublin, New Hampshire for alleged malpractice. As
reported in the Monadnock Ledger in May, 1995, [1] the suit alleged
that Linda Bean's treatment included an unacceptable form of therapy
known as "reparenting" and that Mark Peterson had temporarily
convinced her that she suffered from Multiple Personality Disorder and
had been "programmed as a child as part of a Satanic cult." The suit
further alleged that Mark Peterson convinced Linda Bean to sue a close
family member out-of-state for alleged sexual abuse and that both
Petersons gave false testimony in that suit. The trial was scheduled
for November but settled under confidential terms on July 30, 1997.

 1. Poor, Eric, "Jaffrey couple brings suit over malpractice: Beans
charge that Dublin psychologist abused his position in treatment,"
Monadnock Ledger, May 18, 1995, p. 15.
                         Downing v. McDonough
             Essex County Superior Court, Massaschusetts
Jan Downing's lawsuit brought against her former therapist, Thomas
McDonough in 1994 was reported in The New York Times on April 24,
1994.[1] The article describes her therapist telling her that unless
she retrieved memories of sexual abuse, she would not get better.
After six years of therapy and following her mother's death, Downing
began to question the validity of her memories and the methods of her
therapist. Her story was also featured on the CBS Television news
program, Sixty Minutes, on April 17, 1994. On June 11, 1997, the
lawsuit was resolved between the parties under confidential terms.

 1. Rierden, Andi, "When a buried truth wants out, is it real?" The
New York Times, April 24, 1994, Section 14CN, p. 1. See, also,
McKenna, M.A.J., "'Abuse' backlash builds: 'Victims' deny 'memories,'
sue therapists," The Boston Herald, April 8, 1994, p. 4S.
           Lawsuit Against Attorney Settled in Pennsylvania
A New Jersey couple settled their lawsuit against Pennsylvania
attorney Nancy Wasser who had represented their daughter in a lawsuit
against them in 1990. The lawsuit accused the couple of sexually and
satanically abusing their daughter from ages six months to 18 years,
with nothing to corroborate the allegations. The suit was dismissed
with prejudice in 1995 (see March 1995 FMSF Newsletter).
  In 1992, without a retraction from their daughter, the couple filed
a third-party lawsuit against their daughter's health care workers and
their Agency which settled in that case (see February 1996 FMSF
  The counts in the complaint against Ms Wasser included: Wrongful Use
of Civil Proceedings; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Invasion of Privacy
(the defendant publicly disclosed allegations against the couple in at
least three television appearances and in several newspaper articles).
As far as the Foundation is aware, this is the first lawsuit brought
against an attorney for filing a suit based on "repressed memories."
  After being involved in litigation for nearly seven years, the
couple feel that with the settlement in this last lawsuit, those
responsible for the harm done to their family have been held
                             ACTION TAKEN
                      George Franklin files suit
against daughter, psychiatric witness, therapist, and county officials
George Franklin v. Lenore Terr, et al., United States District Court,
          Northern District of California, No. C97-2443 SBA
Background: George Franklin was convicted in 1990 of a murder based on
his daughter Eileen's repressed memory testimony. Franklin's criminal
trial was the first in the nation involving the then largely unknown
phenomenon of repressed memories. After serving almost seven years of
a life sentence, Franklin's murder conviction was overturned in 1995
by U.S. District Judge D. Lowell Jensen.[1] The 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed and adopted Judge Jensen's 51-page opinion which held
violations of the United States Constitution in the trial had a
substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict.[2] Among other
errors, the court held that the prosecution's emphasis throughout the
trial that Franklin's refusal to deny Eileen's accusation during a
jailhouse visit "compellingly" proved his guilt, and the trial judge's
jury instruction that this circumstance could be considered an
admission of guilt, violated Franklin's constitutional rights. The
court also found that due to the prosecution's involvement in the
jailhouse visit, Eileen had acted as a government agent in violation
of Franklin's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.[3] In addition,
Judge Jensen found that Franklin's constitutional rights were further
violated by the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence of newspaper
articles about the murder. The prosecution last year decided not to
retry the case following a June, 1996, hearing in which Eileen's
sister, Janice, testified that both she and Eileen had been hypnotized
by therapist Kirk Barrett before the first trial.[4] This contradicted
Eileen's trial testimony that she had not been hypnotized but had
falsely told family members she had been hypnotized because she
thought they would be more likely to believe her story.
  The current case: Two years after his murder conviction was
overturned, George Franklin, in a highly publicized move, filed a
civil suit in Federal Court on June 30, 1997 against his daughter
Eileen Franklin-Lipsker, her therapist Kirk Barrett, psychiatric
expert witness Dr. Leonore Terr, San Mateo District Attorney Jim Fox
and several San Mateo County officials. The complaint for violation of
civil rights and pendent state claims states eight causes of action.
The suit alleges, inter alia: i. that the acts and omissions regarding
the use of hypnosis and perjured testimony were made pursuant to a
conspiracy among defendants Eileen, Barrett and San Mateo County
Officials to deprive plaintiff Franklin of liberty without due process
of law and the right to confront the witnesses against him in
violation of his Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; ii.
that San Mateo County officials, knowing that Franklin had been given
his Miranda warnings and aware that they were forbidden to contact
plaintiff without the presence of his counsel, conspired to have
Eileen visit her father in jail in order to unlawfully obtain a
statement of confession from him and having failed to obtain one,
wrongfully used his silence against him at trial in violation of his
Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; iii. that certain
defendants conspired to introduce perjured testimony denying Eileen's
exposure to, and use of, public domain information which would have
undermined her credibility about her supposed unique source of
eyewitness knowledge when in fact, it was known the information was
widely available in the press; iv. that the prosecution's expert
witness, Dr. Lenore Terr, a psychiatrist and author of a book about
the case, (Unchained Memories) conspired with Deputy District Attorney
Elaine Tipton to present knowingly false testimony regarding recovered
memories without any basis in social science research, in violation of
Terr's duties as a licensed psychiatrist; and v. that prior to 1996,
Eileen told certain defendants that she remembered Franklin committing
additional murders which were found to be false.
  Nonetheless, District Attorney Jim Fox publicly maintains that
Franklin is guilty of the murder.[5] In his first public appearance
since his release last year, Franklin said, "However nutty or even
malicious Eileen's accusations were, they would have had little effect
on my life if the other defendants in this case ... had acted
  The suit seeks, in part, compensatory and punitive damages for the
loss of Franklin's liberty, income and reputation and nominal damages
of $1 against his daughter Eileen.

 1. Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F.Supp. 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1995); See, FMSF
Brief Bank No. 52
 2. Franklin v. Duncan, 95 C.D.O.S. 8806 (1995).
 3. The defense was unaware that the prosecution had assisted Eileen
until after the trial and publication of her book, Sins of the Father.
 4. Associated Press, "Repressed-memory case won't be tried again,"The
New York Times, July 3, 1996.
 5. See, Simon, Mark, "DA refuses to repress memory case opinions,"
The San Francisco Chronicle, July 2, 1997, p. A13. "Told by a TV
reporter yesterday that Franklin said he'd drop the suit if Fox
apologized, the district attorney said: 'I'll apologize. I'm very
sorry Mr. Franklin is out of custody.'"
 6. Vasquez, Daniel, "Repressed memory under fire: Franklin alleges
trial conspiracy, seeks damages," San Jose Mercury News, July 1, 1997.

      Can therapists be held accountable for a recovered memory?
 The Union Leader (Manchester, NH), August 10, 1997, Section A, p. 3.
    Hungerford v. Jones, U.S. District Court, Conord New Hampshire
                         Case No. 96-C-599-M
Joel Hungerford filed a $2 million lawsuit against his daughter's
therapist, Susan L. Jones, last November in federal district court
after his daughter, Laura Bachman, accused him of sexual abuse after
undergoing therapy. Last month, prosecutors dropped the criminal
charges brought in 1993, following the state Supreme Court's recent
ruling that the recovered memories were not reliable.[1] In
Hungerford's ongoing civil lawsuit, the federal district court
dismissed his claims against the therapist for defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. However, it
withheld ruling on Hungerford's claim against the therapist for
negligence, instead referring two questions to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court: Does a mental health care provider owe a legal duty to
the father of an adult patient to diagnose and treat the patient with
requisite skill and competence of the profession when the diagnosis is
that the father sexually abused or assaulted the patient? Does a
mental health care provider owe a duty to act with reasonable care to
avoid foreseeable harm to the father of an adult patient resulting
from treatment or other action taken in relation to mental health
conditions arising from the diagnosis of past sexual abuse or assault?
The federal court said it could not rule on the therapist's motion to
dismiss Hungerford's claims of negligence and professional malpractice
until the common law questions were answered.

 1. State of New Hampshire v. Hungerford / Morahan, 1995 WL 378571
(N.H. Super. Ct. May 23, 1995), aff'd, 1997 WL 358620 (N.H. July 1,
     Althaus v. Cohen, Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
            Pennsylvania Civil Division, Case No. 92-20893
      Superior Court of Pennsylvania No. 1138, Pittsburgh 1996.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has ordered re-argument, en banc
(by the full court) on defendant's appeal which claims error on the
issue of liability by a psychiatrist to a third party. The appeal
stems from the trial judge's pre-trial finding that a duty was owed by
the psychiatrist to persons other than the patient. Following the
ruling, in December 1994 a jury awarded the parents and daughter
$272,232.07 in compensatory damages against the daughter's
psychiatrist, Dr. Judith A. Cohen, for failure to properly diagnose
and encouraging her to believe in nonexistent events, including
parental sexual abuse and Satanic ritual abuse. The hearing is
scheduled for September 3, 1997 at 1:00 p.m.

                      THOUGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS
                    from the Father of a Retractor
                         Saul Wasserman, M.D.

The following observations refer only to adults who fit the typical
FMS pattern. Because people enter therapy for many reasons and because
their personal and family situations are so variable, what I have to
say will certainly not apply in all situations. Further, because these
are general thoughts, they are not meant to represent an analysis,
advice or clinical direction in any specific situation. I am speaking
in a personal, not a professional capacity. With these caveats...
  1. Once established, the sexual abuse survivor belief system is a
closed system. Sending cognitive material such as books or articles
about FMS is not likely to be productive because it is cognitively
dissonant and people are inoculated against it.
  2. The people in the system have usually developed extremely
dependent relationships with their therapists as they cut themselves
off from their prior belief and social network. It's unlikely that a
person will abandon the beliefs as long as the close relationship
remains. This excessive dependency is not sustainable over the long
  3. Often the dependent relationship cannot be sustained because the
person runs out of money; the accuser doesn't get better and the
therapist tires of the process; the accuser discovers that the
therapist is not the idolized figure; or because of the flow of
life -- people move away, etc.
  4. Once separate from the therapist, some accusers slowly start to
feel a desire to reconnect in some way with the family albeit usually
on very limited terms.
  5. Families can sometimes support that process not by challenging
bad memories or images but by holding onto, remembering and discussing
good memories and images.
  6. Being able to have some form of communication is infinitely
better than no communication.
  7. Some retractors report that they first rethought the situation in
response to information they got through the media. Discussions about
the issue on talk shows and TV programs about the issue do seem to
help -- when the person is open or ready to hear them.
  8. It may be better to agree, on an interim basis, not to have
confrontations on the issue of the alleged abuse, and focus more
energy on restoring the relationship in other areas and ways. This
allows the parent to be seen more as a human and less as a monster.
  9. There may have been problems in the parent-child relationship
prior to the person entering therapy. Being accepting and open about
these rather than being defensive probably helps the reconciliation
  10. Sometimes retractors have realized that they have gone astray
when they changed therapists and began working with mainline (non RMT)
therapists. A mainline therapist may be very helpful.
  11. The process of retraction is emotionally very difficult. It is a
process and not an event. It takes quite a period of time -- six
months to a year is not unusual. During this time the person going
through it is torn with doubt and confusion. The abuse images and
memories are quite vivid (more vivid, I think than normal memories)
and they persist even when the person starts to doubt their validity.
In effect you have to tell yourself that something that seems real is
not -- somewhat akin to the phenomenon of phantom pain-pain from an
amputated limb.
  12. It seems best not to blast the accuser with the anger the
falsely accused person feels. Try to remember that as much as the
parent's life has been disrupted, the child's life has been more
disrupted. Families who have been reunited consistently report that
the process goes better when they struggle to hold onto a loving,
rather than an angry stance. I admit this is at times not easy.
  13. It's said that 95% of the people who join cults eventually
leave them. This situation is cult-like and it's likely that many
(but not all) of the accusers will, if their families live long
enough, reestablish contact. If the peak of RMT was 1988-92, and the
number of retractors is now increasing, we can estimate that the
process could easily take 3-10 years.

                  M A K E   A   D I F F E R E N C E
| When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall |
| one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.      |
|                                                       Edmund Burke |
|    Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontent Vol. i. p. 526. |
  This is a column that will let you know what people are doing to
  counteract the harm done by FMS. Remember that three and a half
  years ago, FMSF didn't exist. A group of 50 or so people found each
  other and today more than 18,000 have reported similar experiences.
  Together we have made a difference. How did this happen?

CALIFORNIA: A Mom wrote that after two years of writing to Ann
Landers, she was ready to give up, but she didn't! She sent her next
letter "priority mail" and she got results. In June, Ann Landers had a
letter about FMS. It is clear that persistence pays. So this Mom's
advice is to continue to write, call and fax.

CALIFORNIA: A Dad advised: "The George Franklin case in California has
received national press. Now that Franklin has filed suit against his
daughter, her therapist, the prosecutors and an expert witness there
will be additional attention. I think this is a golden opportunity for
family members to speak out. When you see an article in the newspaper
or a magazine, write to the reporter and send a carbon copy to the
editor. When you see something on TV news shows like "Dateline," write
and tell them your story. When you hear the topic on your local talk
radio, call in! The more people who speak up, the sooner this
nightmare will come to an end."

MISSOURI: About 4 months ago I gave copies of three books to three
branches of the public library. The books were: Second Thoughts,
Making Monsters, and Beware the Talking Cure. The books have been
checked out almost continually since they hit the shelves. One branch
even ordered another copy of Beware the Talking Cure to meet the
backlog of requests. I don't think the issue is dead yet here. I am
pleased with the way the books have been received.

  Send your ideas to Katie Spanuello c/o FMSF.

                   F R O M   O U R   R E A D E R S
              Retreading Common Ground v. Middle Ground
Dear Editor:
  I write in response to two letters published in the July/August
Newsletter commenting on my letter in the June issue.
  I agree with Michele Gregg that competent therapists have an ethical
responsibility publicly to discourage use of suggestive forms of
memory-recovery work in therapy. My point was that there is a
widespread misperception to the effect that the FMSF dismisses all or
virtually all recovered-memory experiences as false memories, and that
this misperception undermines support for the Foundation.
  I was not persuaded by P. T.'s arguments against my use of
the term "recovered-memory experience" (RME) to encompass both
essentially accurate and essentially false memories. I note, however,
that we agree on the central issue, in that T. did allow for the
possibility of essentially accurate recollections of long-forgotten
childhood sexual abuse. T. proposed to refer to such cases with a
"fresh neutral term" such as "intermittent recollection," but the
proposed terms are not neutral --rather, they presuppose the essential
accuracy of the remembering experiences in question (just as T.'s
preferred use of the term "recovered memories" appears to presuppose
the essential fallaciousness of those remembering experiences). It is
very likely that some subjective experiences of remembering childhood
sexual abuse (RMEs) are essentially accurate ("forgotten-and-
remembered"), others are essentially illusory products of suggestion
and imagination ("false memories"), and yet others combine essentially
accurate and inaccurate material.
  T. and, in a separate article in the same issue, Allen Feld
claimed that corroboration is essential. If I understand their
arguments correctly, they hold that reports of childhood sexual abuse
based on recovered-memory experiences should be viewed as false unless
corroborated. Feld said there is no "middle line" on the need for
corroboration. I suggest that the definition of the middle ground,
with respect to this particular issue, has to do with the definition
of the term "corroboration." If the term is defined along the lines of
"unambiguous material evidence," many genuine reports of abuse would
falsely be dismissed because such evidence is often lacking even in
genuine abuse cases. In contrast, if "corroboration" is defined as the
existence of any evidence that might be construed by some as
supporting the allegations (e.g., the complainant's relationship
difficulties in adulthood), then many false allegations would
erroneously be classified as "corroborated." Thus, although Mr. Feld
may be correct in saying that there is no room for debate about the
need for corroboration, there is plenty of room for both extremism and
a middle ground when it comes to the definition of corroboration.
  Concerns regarding corroboration will be lessened (albeit not
eliminated) if we can convince practitioners, publishers, and the
popular media to stop promoting approaches likely to contribute to the
development of false memories. This is a goal I share with Feld,
Gregg, and T., and with the FMSF. I believe that it is important
that this goal be pursued in ways that will not undermine support for
genuine victims of childhood sexual abuse. I also believe that the
public and professional image and credibility of the FMSF can be
enhanced by continued unambiguous statements making clear that the
Foundation does not dismiss all RMEs as false, does not categorize all
practitioners who work with sexual abuse issues as dangerous
therapists, does not condone harassment of therapists, etc. The more
often and more clearly such statements are made, the harder it will be
for critics to dismiss the FMSF as reactionary and extremist.
                                                  Yours sincerely,
                                         D. Stephen Lindsay, Ph.D.
                                   Unilever Senior Research Fellow
                                    Prof of Psychology, U Victoria

Dear Editor,
  The premise of a reconciliatory "middle ground" approach is
expressed by a statement such as "some recovered memories are true and
some are false." This statement can be made only by lumping together
two totally different mental categories: the "repressed-and-recovered
memories" and the "re-remembered memories." The statement "Some
recovered memories are true and some are false" is acceptable to
therapists, especially those who engage in memory recovery work. It
legitimizes their actions regardless of the outcome and it permits
them to continue in their often harmful activities.
  On the other hand, this statement is totally unacceptable to the
individuals accused on the basis of "repressed-and-recovered memories"
and their supporters. It implies that some (a few? many? most?) of the
people who report that the accusation was based on "recovered
memories" are actually guilty (because "...some recovered memories are
true.") It puts the presumption of innocence on its head.
  A middle of the road approach will not, cannot, lead to
reconciliation of the two parties involved. On the contrary, it will
only deepen the gap between them. It does not offer a practical
guideline that would lead us out of this therapy-induced mess. The
quest for rigorous corroboration of the "recovered memories" offers
this guideline and it should be acceptable, without any reservations,
to both the ethical therapists and to the falsely accused individuals.
                                              P. T., Ph.D.

                   An Open Letter to Steve Lindsay
Dear Steve,
  Your letter to the editor serves the useful purpose of allowing me
to attempt to clarify the importance and use of corroboration. The
definition is indeed elusive and will frequently vary by the interests
and values of the definer and the individual situation. However, it is
clear you misunderstand and misstate my argument. At no time do I
indicate what you attribute to me: "...reports of childhood sexual
abuse based on recovered memory experience should be viewed as false
unless corroborated." What I believe is that these kinds of memories
are uncertain, neither true or false, and the veracity of these kinds
of memories can only be determined by corroboration. To further define
my position, let's first examine corroboration from two perspectives,
that of a therapist and that of a client. When should a therapist
tell his/his client that "I believe that your new memories of sexual
abuse are true?" My answer is, when there is certainty: a confession
by the abuser, a witness to the abuse, and/or unambiguous physical
evidence. The stakes are too high for everyone concerned to accept
anything less.
  You point out the perplexing dilemma that "... many genuine reports
of abuse would falsely be dismissed...". That may be a likely outcome
that no one wants to see. Unfortunately, research underscores the
inability of even highly-trained therapists to distinguish when
clients are being truthful and when they are not. In fact, therapists'
ability to differentiate true from false statements seems no better
than chance or the ability of non-therapists. The other side of the
dilemma, that "Many false reports of abuse would lead to wrongful
imprisonment, unnecessary lawsuits and family devastation," describes
outcomes neither of us want.
  Let's look at corroboration from a client's perspective. When should
a client say, "I believe that my new memories of sexual abuse are
true?" This a more troubling question because people have a right to
choose what they believe and assume the responsibility to live with
their choices. I have no Solomon-like wisdom to even deem to answer
this kind of question beyond what I've written above. What would you
suggest should be the level of support for these newly-created
memories? When would it be in the best interest of a client to decide
that she/he is a victim of abuse when that abuse is uncertain? When
would it be in the best interest of a client to sever family ties when
the new memories are unverified beyond a client's (or therapist's)
belief? How is it helpful for anyone to attach reality to a belief of
being sexually abused when there is no objective foundation for that
  What standards of corroboration would you require to address the two
circumstances I pose in this letter? How would your answers compare to
what should be the standard in the courts in our two countries?
Individuals' and society's interests are better served when people
accept the likely ambiguity and uncertainty that often exist in the
circumstances of new memories of abuse by adults. I am unable to find
a "middle ground" on corroboration that excludes an objective
dimension. Since you are the one suggesting there may be one, it seems
reasonable that the burden is for you to define such a standard.
 Finally, I feel it is important to respond to your continuing concern
that the Foundation make it clear that it does not dismiss all claims
of what you call the "recovered memory experience." By confusing and
merging what has been historically the position of the Foundation
(that some memories may be true, some false and some a mixture of
both) with "perceptions" of the Foundation's position created by
others (that all recovered memories are false), you may
unintentionally add to the myth that the Foundation is hostile to all
"recovered memories." Inaccurate perceptions about the Foundation are
shaped by some who have little knowledge of the Foundation's position
and rely on misinformation spoken and written by others. I am certain
you would not want to inadvertently add to this misperception.
                                                         Allen Feld
  Allen Feld is Director of Continuing Education for the FMS
  Foundation. He has retired from the faculty of the School of 
  Social Work at Marywood College in Pennsylvania.
                             A Thank You
Dear "K" and "L",
  Bless you! I'm sure your efforts on behalf of FMSF played a big part
in our happiness today. Here is the latest:
  Our daughter lives within 25 miles of you. Because of all the
publicity that you obtained because of the Ellen Bass lecture at
Marquette and then with all the publicity about the judgment in favor
of Nadean Cool in Wisconsin, I am certain that my daughter was exposed
to information laying bare the problems of recovered memory therapy.
Last December, my daughter came to visit her sister and we were
invited. Then on Mother's Day, I received a plant from my daughter
and her family. Last month, my daughter and her family came to visit
  While my husband wants to press for answers, a talk with folks at
the FMS Foundation convinced us that maybe it is better to take it
easy, as recanting is very slow.
  So while you may not realize it, your work has done some good.
Perhaps we all may be helping somone else. I believe your efforts have
helped us. Thanks and we will pray for your success with your
                           _______________                    "E"
                           A United Family
My accusing daughter, believing that a sister feminist would never
blow a case this badly, had asked for a family confrontation. The
psychiatrist told my daughter I would probably confess. When I would
not confess, she admitted to being puzzled by my objections to her
conclusions. The psychiatrist was unequal to the task of convincing
our large and united family that her diagnosis was not to be
  Our daughter has returned and is affectionate and maybe even warmer
than she was in the past. It took a long time for the full recovery of
the family. I thank God that the damage was as little as it was.
  Everyone in our family wonders how a reputable psychiatrist could
have been incapable of asking herself, "What if I am wrong?" Even
more, we wonder, "How could a sensible human being believe that a
charge of incest was of so little consequence."
                                                             A Dad
                       Message from a Retractor
The FMS Foundation conference "Memory and Reality: The Next Steps" was
held in Baltimore on March 22 and 23. It was a pleasure meeting many
of you there. The conference was emotional and motivating for me. On
Friday night, just the sight of all those parents in line to register
was heart-breaking. The parents were wonderful, and always so excited
and pleased to find a retractor. One father told my husband, "When she
said she was a retractor, I just wanted to hug her!"
  During a few of the presentations on Saturday, I felt somewhat
awkward. There were times, for example, when parents would laugh about
some of the more ludicrous "memories" (eating babies, etc.). Perhaps
it was just nervous laughter, and I certainly don't think any of the
parents meant to offend retractors, but it's hard to laugh when you
once believed similar ridiculous but horrible things. I think that's
part of the value in having retractors connected with the FMS
Foundation -- only we can point out to them our own unique perspective.
There is so much pain on all sides of this issue; it's easy to forget
what other family members might be experiencing and, in doing so,
direct our anger at each other instead of at the therapy. I overheard
parents talking about how their hearts bled for the retractors on the
panels, and I had an accuser's sibling who attended tell me that the
conference helped him to understand the sister who is supporting his
accusing sister. To those of you who atttended, I would love to hear
your thoughts.
                                                   Donna Anderson
                                          "The Retractors' Voice"
                                            Issue No 2, July 1997
(Contact Donna Anderson, 6085 Byram Lake Drive, Linden, Michigan 48451
for information about "The Retractors' Voice")
                      Ex-Spouses of FMS Victims
I spent 10 years of my life involved with my wife's therapy. Then my
wife sent "The Letter" to her kind, loving and considerate parents.
They told her to "get real" and refused to pay for her questionable
therapy. My wife then moved out, abandoning our daughter, and sued me
for divorce with life-time alimony.
  I would like to make contact with other ex-spouses. How do others
deal with custody issues, children's visitation with a disturbed
parent, harassment, feelings of anger that a therapist encouraged
divorce, and concerns about relationships with former in-laws? You can
write to me, David P., at the FMS Foundation.

         Conference at Quinnipiac College School of Law (CT)
                          November 14, 1997

On Friday, November 14, 1997, the Quinnipiac College School of Law
will present an all-day conference on the subject of recovered
memories of child sexual abuse, entitled " Weighing the evidence of
recovered memories: Legal, scientific and clinical issues." The
conference will bring together speakers with varying perspectives on
the issue, including several scientists at the forefront of memory
research. The speakers will include: Pamela Freyd, Ph.D., director of
the False Memory Syndrome Foundation; Mark Pendergrast, author of
"Victims of Memory;" Jerome Singer, Ph.D., Professor and former Chair
of the Yale University Department of Psychology; Attorney Charles
Fleischmann, who represented the defendants in the case of Borawick v.
Shay; Jonathan Schooler, Ph.D., research psychologist at the
University of Pittsburgh; Stephen Lindsay, Ph.D., research
psychologist at the University of Victoria; Anita Lipton, Coordinator
of Legal Research for the False Memory Syndrome Foundation; and Robin
Grant-Hall, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist who specializes in trauma.
  There is no fee for attending the conference, but advance
registration is requested as lunch will be served to attendees. The
college is located in Hamden, Connecticut, just outside of New Haven.
For those who require lodging, some rooms are available at the
Wallingford Marriott at $99 per night. For information and
reservations, please contact Pam Castellano at (203) 287-3254.

                     |       1st Meeting        |
                     |      El Paso, Texas      |
                     |     October 8, 1997      |
                     |   for details contact    |
                     | Mary Lou at 915-591-0271 |

                     S T A T E   M E E T I N G S
             Call persons listed for info & registration

       Columbus - Saturday                 Cleveland - Sunday
       September 6, 1997                   September 7, 1997
  Holiday Inn - Rt 23 and 1270        Holiday Inn - I77 and Rockside
                            1:30-5:00 P.M.
                        Lunch - $15 per person
  Price includes lunch, room, and plane tickets for the Rutherfords.
  It will be the most worthwhile program you will attend this year.
      Please come to either event and bring friends and family.
              Reservations to Bob or Carole 216-888-7963 

                3 EVENTS in the ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION
                         When Memories Lie...
           Legal, Social, Psycholgical and Emotional Impact 
                     of Recovered Memory Therapy
       AMOS MARTINEZ (CO Grievance Board); RICHARD OFSHE, Ph.D
                        The RUTHERFORD FAMILY
     Friday -  Ft. Collins CO           Saturday -  Greeley, CO
         October 3, 1997                    October 4, 1997
          Mountain Crest                      University of 
   Behavioral Healthcare System             Northern Colorado
        4601 Corbett Drive                  University Center
       (off E. Harmony Rd)             (corner of 20th & 11th Ave)
                         8:00 AM - 5:00 P.M.
                  Admission fee for either seminar:
           $15.00 including lunch (sandwiches from Quiznos)
           To register contact Lori DeWeese at 970-225-9191
               For FMS Families -- Meet the Rutherfords
            Sunday October 5, 1997,1:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M.
             Life Fellowship Church, 11500 Sheriday Blvd
                        Westminster, CO  80020
 The Rutherfords will answer questions we all have about how to work
    through and survive the devastation of age regression therapy.
                           No Admission fee
   For information about the Sunday program call Ruth 303-757-3622.

                         ILLINOIS FMS SOCIETY
   What is the Mental Health Industry doing to stop "Junk Therapy?"
                     October 18, 1997, 9AM to 5PM
            Schaumburg Marriott, 50 North Martingale Road
                        Schaumburg, IL  60173
 Keynote Speaker: TANA DINEEN, Ph.D. Author of Manufacturing Victims
         Everyone welcome, Call 847-240-0100,Fax 847-240-0120
          Donation:  $35 person, $60/couple, Includes lunch
                 ($5/ person additional at the door)
                 Reservations requested by October 4.
     Call 815-467-6041, Fax 815-467-7764, e-mail:

                Saturday, October 18, 1997, Helena, MT
           Speakers: PAMELA FREYD and the RUTHERFORD FAMILY
                  Contact Lee & Avone (406) 443-3189

                         Tri - State Meeting
                      Saturday, November 1, 1997
          Guest Speakers will include: The Rutherford Family
                    Contact Jim & Jo: 610-783-0396

               "Crisis in the Church: Counseling Abuse"
           November 14 & 15 at Rollins College, Winter Park
    John and Nancy (352) 750-5446 or Bob and Janet (813) 856-7091
  Presented by Central Florida Friends of FMSF and Rollins College,
       with the cooperation of the Florida Council of Churches.
PAUL SIMPSON, Ed.D., A Tucson, AZ psychologist and professional family
The RUTHERFORD FAMILY, who settled a lawsuit against a church
therapist, a church and its pastor for $1 million.
ELIZABETH CARLSON, Retractor who was awarded $2.51 million by a jury
because her therapist implanted false memories of sexual abuse.
DON RUSSO, A Miami attorney who represented a retractor who received a
$650,000 settlement from therapist who implanted false memories of
sexual abuse.
ROBIN SYMONS, A Miami trial attorney who defended a father falsely
accused in a lawsuit filed against him by his daughter.
TWO PARENTS whose daughters received regression therapy by Christian
counselors before accusing their fathers of childhood sexual abuse.
  Advanced registration for the conference is $25.00 for the first
person, and $15.00 for each additional person from the same family or
congregation (in the same mailing). Students may register for $10.00
                        Special Family Meeting
             Friday night, November 14, 7:00 - 10:00 P.M.
  There will also be a meeting for falsely accused families on the
Rollins campus. Dr. Simpson and the Rutherfords will discuss coping
and reconciliation. For a brochure or more information about these
programs, please contact John and Nancy at 352-750-5446 or Email at

                F M S    B U L L E T I N    B O A R D
  (MO) = monthly; (bi-MO) = bi-monthly; (*) = see State Meetings list

Contacts & Meetings:

        Bob (907) 586-2469
        Barbara (602) 924-0975; 854-0404(fax)
  Little Rock
        Al & Lela (501) 363-4368
  Sacramento - (quarterly)
        Joanne & Gerald (916) 933-3655
        Rudy (916)443-4041
  San Fransico & North Bay - (bi-MO)
        Gideon (415) 389-0254 or
        Charles 984-6626(am); 435-9618(pm)
  East Bay Area - (bi-MO)
        Judy (510) 254-2605
  South Bay Area - Last Sat. (bi-MO)
        Jack & Pat (408) 425-1430
        3rd Sat. (bi-MO) @10am
  Los Angeles County
        Cecilia (310) 545-6064
  Central Coast
        Carole (805) 967-8058
  Central Orange County - 1st Fri. (MO) @ 7pm
        Chris & Alan (714) 733-2925
  Orange County - 3rd Sun. (MO) @6pm
        Jerry & Eileen (714) 494-9704
  Covina Area - 1st Mon. (MO) @7:30pm
        Floyd & Libby (818) 330-2321
  San Diego Area  -
        Dee (619) 941-0630
  Denver  - 4th Sat. (MO) @1pm
        Art (303) 572-0407
  S. New England  - (bi-MO) Sept-May
        Earl (203) 329-8365 or
        Paul (203) 458-9173
        Madeline (305) 966-4FMS
  Boca/Delray  - 2nd & 4th Thurs (MO) @1pm
        Helen (407) 498-8684
  Central Florida  - 4th Sun. (MO) @2:30 pm
        John & Nancy (352) 750-5446
  Tampa Bay Area
        Bob & Janet (813) 856-7091
        Wallie & Jill (770) 971-8917
  Carolyn (808) 261-5716
  Chicago & Suburbs  - 3rd Sun. (MO)
        Eileen (847) 985-7693
        Roger & Liz (815) 467-6041
  Rest of Illinois
        Bryant & Lynn (309) 674-2767
  Indiana Assn. for Responsible Mental Health Practices
        Nickie (317) 471-0922; ((fax) 317) 334-9839
        Pat (219) 482-2847
  Des Moines - 2nd Sat. (MO) @11:30 am Lunch
        Betty & Gayle (515) 270-6976
  Kansas City - 2nd Sun. (MO)
        Leslie (913) 235-0602 or
        Pat (913) 738-4840
        Jan (816) 931-1340
  Louisville- Last Sun. (MO) @ 2pm
        Bob (502) 957-2378
        Francine (318) 457-2022
        Irvine & Arlene (207) 942-8473
  Freeport -  4th Sun. (MO)
        Carolyn  (207) 364-8891
   Ellicot City Area
        Margie (410) 750-8694
  Andover  -  2nd Sun. (MO) @ 1pm
        Ron (508) 250-9756
        Frank (508) 263-9795
  Grand Rapids Area-Jenison - 1st Mon. (MO)
        Bill & Marge (616) 383-0382
  Greater Detroit Area - 3rd Sun. (MO)
        Nancy (810) 642-8077
        Terry & Collette (507) 642-3630
        Dan & Joan (612) 631-2247
  Kansas City  -  2nd Sun. (MO)
        Leslie (913) 235-0602 or Pat 738-4840
        Jan (816) 931-1340
  St. Louis Area  -  3rd Sun. (MO)
        Karen (314) 432-8789
        Mae (314) 837-1976
    Retractors group also forming
  Springfield - 4th Sat. (MO) @12:30pm
        Dorothy & Pete (417) 882-1821
        Howard (417) 865-6097
        Lee & Avone (406) 443-3189
  See Wayne, PA
  Albuquerque  - 1st  Sat. (MO) @1 pm
  Southwest Room -Presbyterian Hospital
        Maggie (505) 662-7521 (after 6:30 pm)
        or Martha 624-0225
  Westchester, Rockland, etc. - (bi-MO)
        Barbara (914) 761-3627
  Upstate/Albany Area  - (bi-MO)
        Elaine (518) 399-5749
  Western/Rochester Area -  (bi-MO)
        George & Eileen (716) 586-7942
  Susan (704) 481-0456
  Oklahoma City
        Dee (405) 942-0531
        HJ (405) 755-3816
        Rosemary (405) 439-2459

        Paul & Betty (717) 691-7660
        Rick & Renee (412) 563-5616
        John (717) 278-2040
  Wayne (includes S. NJ) - 2nd Sat. in June @1pm
               (No meeting in September or October)
        Jim & Jo (610) 783-0396
  Wed. (MO) @1pm
        Kate (615) 665-1160
        Jo or Beverly (713) 464-8970
   El Paso
        Mary Lou (915) 591-0271
        Keith (801) 467-0669
        (bi-MO) Judith (802) 229-5154
        Sue (703) 273-2343
        Pat (304) 291-6448
        Katie & Leo (414) 476-0285
        Susanne & John (608) 427-3686

  Vancouver & Mainland - Last Sat. (MO) @ 1- 4pm
        Ruth (604) 925-1539
  Victoria & Vancouver Island - 3rd Tues. (MO) @7:30pm
        John (250) 721-3219
        Joan (204) 284-0118
  London -2nd Sun (bi-MO)
        Adriaan (519) 471-6338
        Eileen (613) 836-3294
  Toronto /N. York
        Pat (416) 444-9078
        Ethel (705) 924-2546
        Ken & Marina (905) 637-6030
        Paula (705) 692-0600
        Alain (514) 335-0863
  St. Andre Est.
        Mavis (514) 537-8187
        Irene (03) 9740 6930
  FMS ASSOCIATION fax-(972) 2-259282 or
  Task Force FMS of Werkgroep Fictieve Herinneringen
        Anna (31) 20-693-5692
        Colleen (09) 416-7443
        Ake Moller FAX (48) 431-217-90
  The British False Memory Society
        Roger Scotford (44) 1225 868-682
         Deadline for the October Newsletter is September 15
      Meeting notices MUST be in writing and should be sent no 
     later than TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO MEETING. You must be a State 
      Contact or GroupLeader to post notices in this section.

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| if  you wish to receive electronic versions of this newsletter and |
| notices of radio and television  broadcasts  about  FMS.  All  the |
| message need say is "add to the FMS-News". You'll also learn about |
| joining  the  FMS-Research list (it distributes research materials |
| such as news stories, court decisions and research  articles).  It |
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| addresses and names will remain strictly confidential).            |
  The False Memory Syndrome Foundation is a qualified 501(c)3 corpora-
tion  with  its  principal offices in Philadelphia and governed by its 
Board of Directors.  While it encourages participation by its  members
in  its  activities,  it must be understood that the Foundation has no 
affiliates and that no other organization or person is  authorized  to
speak for the Foundation without the prior written approval of the Ex-
ecutive Director. All membership dues and contributions to the Founda-
tion must be forwarded to the Foundation for its disposition.

Pamela Freyd, Ph.D.,  Executive Director

FMSF Scientific and Professional  Advisory Board,    September 1, 1997
AARON T. BECK, M.D., D.M.S., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
PA;  TERENCE W.  CAMPBELL,  Ph.D.,  Clinical and Forensic  Psychology,
Sterling Heights,  MI; ROSALIND CARTWRIGHT,  Ph.D., Rush  Presbyterian
St. Lukes Medical Center, Chicago, IL; JEAN CHAPMAN, Ph.D., University
of   Wisconsin, Madison,  WI;    LOREN CHAPMAN,  Ph.D.,  University of
Wisconsin, Madison, WI;    FREDERICK C.  CREWS,   Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley,   CA; ROBYN M.    DAWES,  Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon
University,  Pittsburgh,  PA; DAVID F.   DINGES,  Ph.D., University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; HENRY C.   ELLIS, Ph.D., University of
New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM; GEORGE K. GANAWAY, M.D., Emory University
of Medicine, Atlanta,  GA; MARTIN GARDNER, Author,  Hendersonville, NC
ROCHEL GELMAN, Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, CA; HENRY
GLEITMAN, Ph.D., University   of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,  PA; LILA
GLEITMAN, Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; RICHARD
GREEN, M.D., J.D., Charing Cross  Hospital, London; DAVID A. HALPERIN,
M.D., Mount Sinai School  of Medicine, New  York, NY; ERNEST  HILGARD,
Ph.D., Stanford  University, Palo Alto, CA;   JOHN HOCHMAN, M.D., UCLA
Medical School, Los Angeles, CA; DAVID S. HOLMES, Ph.D., University of
Kansas, Lawrence, KS; PHILIP  S.  HOLZMAN, Ph.D., Harvard  University,
Cambridge,   MA; ROBERT A.  KARLIN,  Ph.D.   , Rutgers University, New
Brunswick,  NJ;   HAROLD  LIEF,  M.D.,  University    of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA; ELIZABETH  LOFTUS, Ph.D., University  of Washington,
Seattle,   WA; SUSAN L.   McELROY,  M.D.   , University of Cincinnati,
Cincinnati,   OH;  PAUL    McHUGH,  M.D.,   Johns  Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD;  HAROLD  MERSKEY, D.M., University  of Western Ontario,
London, Canada;  SPENCER  HARRIS  MORFIT, Author, Boxboro,   MA; ULRIC
NEISSER, Ph.D.,  Emory University, Atlanta,  GA; RICHARD OFSHE, Ph.D.,
University  of  California, Berkeley,  CA;   EMILY CAROTA ORNE,  B.A.,
University  of Pennsylvania,   Philadelphia, PA;  MARTIN  ORNE,  M.D.,
Ph.D., University  of Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia, PA; LOREN PANKRATZ,
Ph.D.,   Oregon  Health Sciences  University,  Portland,  OR; CAMPBELL
PERRY,  Ph.D.,  Concordia   University, Montreal,  Canada;  MICHAEL A.
PERSINGER, Ph.D.,  Laurentian University,  Ontario, Canada;  AUGUST T.
PIPER, Jr.,   M.D., Seattle, WA;  HARRISON   POPE, Jr.,  M.D., Harvard
Medical  School,  Boston,  MA;  JAMES   RANDI,  Author and   Magician,
Plantation,   FL; HENRY L.    ROEDIGER,  III, Ph.D.  ,Rice University,
Houston,  TX; CAROLYN  SAARI, Ph.D., Loyola   University, Chicago, IL;
THEODORE   SARBIN, Ph.D., University of    California, Santa Cruz, CA;
THOMAS A.  SEBEOK, Ph.D., Indiana University, Bloomington, IN; MICHAEL
A.    SIMPSON,  M.R.C.S.,   L.R.C.P.,   M.R.C,   D.O.M., Center    for
Psychosocial &   Traumatic Stress,  Pretoria, South   Africa; MARGARET
SINGER, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, CA; RALPH SLOVENKO,
J.D.,  Ph.D., Wayne State University   Law School, Detroit, MI; DONALD
SPENCE, Ph.D.,  Robert Wood  Johnson  Medical Center,  Piscataway, NJ;
JEFFREY VICTOR,  Ph.D.,  Jamestown Community  College, Jamestown,  NY;
HOLLIDA   WAKEFIELD,  M.A.,   Institute   of Psychological  Therapies,
Northfield, MN; CHARLES A. WEAVER, III, Ph.D. Baylor University, Waco,

   Y E A R L Y   FMSF   M E M B E R S H I P   I N F O R M A T I O N
Professional - Includes Newsletter       $125_______

Family - Includes Newsletter             $100_______

                       Additional Contribution:_____________


___VISA:  Card: #________-________-________-________ exp. date ___/___

___MASTER CARD: #________-________-________-________ exp. date ___/___

___Check or Money Order: Payable to FMS FOUNDATION IN U.S. DOLLARS.



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