FMSF NEWSLETTER ARCHIVE - July/August, 1996 - Vol. 5, No. 1, HTML version

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    The FMSF Newsletter is published 10 times a year by the  False
    Memory  Syndrome  Foundation.  A hard-copy subscription is in-
    cluded in membership fees (to join, see last page). Others may
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    ISSN #1069-0484.  Copyright (c) 1996  by  the  FMSF Foundation
  Focus on Science
    Quintiliani                            JULY/AUGUST
      Kenny                            IS A COMBINED ISSUE
        Legal Corner
          From Our Readers

Dear Friends,

  "Is there any progress being made back to sanity?" That is the
question we are most frequently asked by families.
  "What do you want? Why are you condemning all psychotherapy?" That
is what some professionals ask us.
  The answer to professionals is brief. We want their help in
restoring our families. We want professionals to help us reach our
children who have rewritten their histories. We want help with the
reconciliation processes. We want assurance from professionals that
this problem will not happen to others. We want professionals to join
us in a search for a "litmus test" to help to distinguish those cases
of true abuse from those of false memories.
  We do not condemn all of psychotherapy. We consider psychotherapy to
be a needed public service just as medical systems are. We expect
those systems to be safe and effective. Certain types of memory
recovery techniques are not safe, and we expect responsible
professionals to ensure that unsafe practices are stopped.
  The answer to families is "yes" profound changes are taking place,
but we still have a long way to go. Children continue to return to
families. We are now starting to hear regularly of returners who
become retractors. It is not a fast process. This past month we heard
from two families who had moving apologies and retractions from their
children three years after they had resumed contact.  Other families
reported retractions after one and two years. Returning and retraction
and reconciliation are processes that take work and time. Our children
are worth the work and the wait.
  A meeting on May 10, 1996 with representatives of the FMS
Foundation, the American Psychiatric Association and the National
Association of Social Workers in Washington, DC at the Psychiatric
Association headquarters is a concrete example of the institutional
changes that are starting.  Dr. Paul Fink, a past president of the
American Psychiatric Association, was instrumental in arranging this
meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to have an open discussion of
the problems that we all share and to look for solutions to them. The
American Psychological Association is still considering its policy on
attending future meetings at which FMSF representatives are present.
  We left the meeting at the Psychiatric Association feeling that a
positive and constructive start had been made that would lead to help
for families and that would also advance clinical practice.
  A continued flow of outstanding popular and scholarly books and
articles about memory and related clinical practice is more good
news. Searching for Memory by D. Schacter and Memory: Remembering and
Forgetting in Everyday Life by B. Gordon are recent examples. New
editions of Making Monsters by Ofshe and Watters and Victims of Memory
by Pendergrast note the great changes in thinking that have taken
place since their initial publication.
  Not all is so positive. On April 27, 1996 a member received a
mailing about the Masters and Johnson Sexual Trauma Programs at River
Oaks Hospital in New Orleans and Two Rivers Hospital in Kansas City.
Included in the text in the packet, "In order to open the doors to the
actual memories and the child's experiences...Utilizing hypnotic
techniques to abreact memories..." Surely it is misleading to imply
that any professional or any hospital had some way to "open the doors
to the actual memories."  River Oaks Hospital was one of the places
credited in the HBO video, "Search for Deadly Memories" in which
viewers could see a physically restrained patient look for 'actual
memories' of satanic ritual abuse during a sodium amytal interview.
  Families must continue to challenge both misleading statements and
individuals who mislead clients about their credentials. This is
important since professional organizations and monitoring boards do
not appear to exercise initiative but respond only to complaints. Good
citizenship demands that families with evidence of wrong-doing report
this to professional licensing boards. Although we know that these
boards currently do not usually respond to complaints of third
parties, this is the only way, other than through legal or legislative
action, to alert these organizations to the scope of the FMS problem.
  A recent talk with a psychoanalytically oriented psychologist and
FMSF supporter gave us insight into the attitudes of some
therapists. She noted that, "Most therapists still think that the FMSF
is a place where perpetrators in denial can hide."  We venture to
guess that "most therapists" referred to have not actually met
affected families. We reflect on the comment from the retracting
therapist who wrote in "First do no harm" (Skeptic, Fall 1995) that
when she practiced recovered memory therapy, she never thought about
how the families of her clients might feel. Families must continue to
make every effort to meet with professionals and professional
organizations. It is easy to demonize someone you don't know. It is
not so easy to demonize a real person who is telling a truthful story.
/                                                                    \ 
|                    CIRCLE MARCH 22 AND 23, 1997                    |
|                                                                    |
|  Initial planning is underway for a national False Memory Syndrome |
| Foundation conference on Saturday March 22 and Sunday, March 23,   |
| 1997. We have reserved space at the Renaissance Hotel (formerly    |
| Stouffer's, the site of the December 1994 conference) located at   |
| the harbor in Baltimore, MD. This third conference will be geared  |
| to discussions of the concerns of families and the Foundation in   |
| light of the changing scientific debate and rapidly changing legal |
| and political climate. A continuing education program will be      |
| cosponsored with Johns Hopkins on March 20 and 21, the two days    |
| prior to the family conference. MAKE YOUR PLANS TO JOIN US IN      |
| BALTIMORE NEXT SPRING.                                             |


  Plans are being finalized for a meeting of the Friends of the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation in Chicago on the evening of October 5,
1996. These periodic get-togethers give members from across the
country the opportunity to be briefed on the changing scientific,
organizational and family developments. "Friends" are Foundation
members who donate a minimum of $400.00 in addition to their
dues. Friends will receive details in the mail.
  The Illinois False Memory Syndrome Society has scheduled its annual
meeting for that same day, so Friends who travel to Chicago can plan
to partake in a full day of programs.
  If you have questions about the meeting or would like to become a
Friend, please contact Lee at 609-967-7812.


  "Clinical Issues in Dealing with False Memories: Prevention and
Family Reconciliation," will be held in Chicago on Friday, October 4,
1996. Terence Campbell, Ph.D. and Carolyn Saari, Ph.D. from the FMSF
Scientific and Professional Advisory Board will be joined by Jack
Wald, DSW to discuss the research on memory, clinical preventative
techniques and family issues and reconciliation. The program will
include an interview with a retractor and a second interview with her
family. Continuing education credits for psychologists and social
workers have been confirmed. Medical continuing education credit for
psychiatrists is being explored. A brochure will be available shortly
and full details will be published in the September Newsletter.


  There is an increasing number of groups calling for Congressional
Hearings to investigate the injustices which have arisen from false
allegations of sexual misconduct. Letters are being sent to:

  The Honorable Orin Hatch, R. Utah
  Chairman, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
  Rm #135 Russell Senate Office Building
  Washington, DC  20510

  Congressman Henry Hyde, Chair
  House Committee on the Judiciary
  2110 Rayburn House Office Building
  Washington, DC  20515

  /                                                                \
  |                         Special Thanks                         |
  |                                                                |
  |         We extend a very special "Thank you" to all of         |
  |        the people who help prepare the FMSF Newsletter.        |  
  |                                                                |
  |    Editorial Support:                                          |
  |        Toby Feld, Allen Feld, Howard Fishman, Peter Freyd      |
  |    Research: Merci Federicia, Michele Gregg, Anita Lipton      |
  |    Notices: Valerie Fling                                      |
  |    Production: Frank Kane                                      |
  |    Columnists: Katie Spanuello and                             |
  |        members of the FMSF Scientific Advisory Board           |
  |    Letters and valuable information: Our Readers               |

                           FOCUS ON SCIENCE

   From time to time, various scientific articles appear which discuss
  issues of childhood sexual abuse, memory, and responses to trauma.
  Since such studies are often widely cited in the scientific and
  popular press, it is critical to recognize their methodological
  limits. It is particularly important to understand what conclusions
  can and cannot legitimately be drawn from these studies on the basis
  of the data presented. As a result, we periodically present analyses
  of recent well-known studies, prepared with help from members of our
  Scientific Advisory Committee.

  Most of us who have experienced a serious traumatic event -- a car
accident, an assault, or a natural disaster -- remember the experience
in great detail.  Indeed, people often report that they remember very
little of what happened during the weeks or months just before and
just after the trauma, but they remember the event itself vividly.
Indeed, when viewed from an evolutionary perspective, it seems
intuitively reasonable that the mind would work in this way. If one
did not vividly remember being attacked by a lion, but instead
"repressed" the memory of the trauma, or "dissociated" at the time of
the attack, one would be liable to wander in front of other lions in
the future -- with inauspicious implications both for one's own
survival and that of one's pedigree.
  This reasoning, however, has not daunted theorists who argue that it
is possible for the brain to develop psychogenic amnesia for a
traumatic event. For example, one prominent theorist, Dr. Lenore Terr,
has argued that individuals do not tend to forget single episodes of
trauma (which she calls "type I" traumas), but that people can develop
amnesia for repeated episodes of trauma (which she calls "type II"
traumas). [Footnote: Terr L.C.: Childhood traumas: an outline and
overview. Am J Psychiatry 148: 10-20, 1991.] There is a certain
intuitive appeal to this theory. An individual subjected to a single
unexpected trauma might possess no innate ability to banish the memory
from consciousness, whereas someone experiencing the same trauma over
and over again might gradually "learn" to dissociate at the time the
trauma was happening, and thus become more skilled at developing
amnesia for an intolerable experience. For example, a child subjected
to repeated experiences of sexual trauma might gradually learn to
dissociate each time that the perpetrator abused her, so that she
imagined herself in a field of flowers, far away from her actual body,
while the abuse was occurring. Thus she could display amnesia for the
event even a short time after it occurred.
  But does this idea stand up to scientific testing? Unfortunately,
there appear to be no methodologically sound quantitative studies that
have attempted to compare memory in victims of single vs. multiple
traumas in a systematic way.  There is one very interesting report,
however, in which a group of experts on hypnosis located a group of
victims with recurrent traumatic episodes of pain, and actually
attempted to train them to dissociate! In this study, Dr. David Dinges
and a large group of collaborators treated 78 patients, most of them
boys and young adults, with sickle cell anemia.  [Footnote: Dinges,
D.F., Orne, E.C., Bloom, P.B., et al. Medical self-hypnosis in the
adjunctive management of organic pain: A prospective study of sickle
cell pain. Presented at the NIH Workshop on Biobehavioral Pain
Research, Rockville, MD, January 19, 1994. ] Sickle cell anemia is the
most common serious genetic disease afflicting African-Americans. It
is characterized by periodic, unpredictable, painful "crises" which
occur when blood vessels become occluded by clumps of abnormal
sickle-shaped red blood corpuscles. Incapacitating crises can occur at
any time -- in the middle of a youngster's birthday party, while
playing in the back yard, or while out on a date. Certainly, if one
could learn to dissociate at the time of such a trauma, it would be a
great advantage.
    The patients were enrolled for up to one year. For five to seven
months, they were administered weekly group training sessions to learn
self-hypnosis, followed by biweekly sessions for another six months.
In a preliminary analysis of the first 37 patients to complete the
study, some promising results were observed: the number of days with
pain was reduced by 8% and the number of days that subjects required
pain medication was reduced by 6%. However, the crises experienced
during the self-hypnosis treatment actually lasted longer, and were
rated as more intense by the patients themselves. Overall, it appeared
that self-hypnosis reduced the milder episodes of pain, but did not
affect the more severe episodes. Certainly, there appeared to be no
evidence that children could learn to forget the crises.
  It might be argued that crises of physical pain differ from the
trauma of repeated physical or sexual abuse. However, we cannot ignore
the findings of the sickle-cell study: even with intensive training by
experts, people can learn to "dissociate" only to a modest degree, and
cannot obliterate major traumatic events from their memories. Thus, it
would seem unlikely that a child, lacking any training in self-
hypnosis at all, could become so adept at dissociating that she or he
could completely expel an entire series of abuse experiences from
consciousness. At the least, then, if one claims that individuals can
develop amnesia for episodes of sexual abuse via "dissociation" or
another such mechanism, one would be obliged to demonstrate how
victims of sexual abuse have a unique ability to do this, when
carefully trained victims of sickle cell anemia cannot.


  The Minneapolis Star-Tribune (6/7/96) reported that Dr. Diane
Humenansky's insurance company agreed to out-of-court settlements with
four former patients who accused her of planting memories of abuse.
Agreements had previously been reached with two other former patients
of Humenansky, each receiving multimillion dollar awards. Four more
lawsuits against the psychiatrist by former patients are pending.


  The Springfield, MO News-Leader, June 23, 1996, described the case
of Beth Rutherford, a young woman who accused her father, an
Assemblies of God minister, and her mother of sexual abuse when she
was a child. Ms Rutherford has since recanted her allegations and
hired a lawyer to sue her unlicensed therapist. Her parents and two
siblings will join in the court action.
  Ms Rutherford's accusations included being impregnated twice by her
father and being forced to perform crude coat-hanger abortions on
herself. A gynecologist who examined her, however, reported she is a
virgin. In addition, her father had a vasectomy when she was four
years old. Rev. Rutherford was fired from his job after the
allegations were made public and wound up working as a janitor. "The
pain in our family can never be taken away," Mrs. Rutherford said.

/                                                                    \ 
|  "We live in an age of evidence-based medicine, and we will        |
| increasingly be expected to justify the methods we use in          |
| psychiatry as in the rest of medicine.  Can the proponents of      |
| recovered memory therapy give us any reasoned evidence that would  |
| convince a skeptical onlooker of the validity of either their      |
| theories or their practices?  If so, they should produce it        |
| immediately, since there seems to be a growing groundswell of      |
| opinion against them."                                             |
|                                      Alistair Muro, MD, Editorial  |
|            Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 41(4) May 1996 page 199  |

                      TWO NEW BOOKS ABOUT MEMORY
             Daniel L. Schacter, Ph.D., Basic Books, 1996

  The author of this scholarly book is a professor of psychology at
Harvard who has spent much of his career studying and writing about
amnesia. Readers of this newsletter will probably find Schacter's
discussion of "dissociation" particularly helpful. One chapter is
devoted entirely to the issue of recovered memories. We print just a
few statements from the book to give an idea of both style and

  REPRESSION: "The strength of the scientific evidence for repression
  depends on exactly how the term is defined. When defined narrowly as
  intentional suppression of an experience, there is little reason to
  doubt that it exists.  But when we talk about a repression mechanism
  that operates unconsciously and defensively to block out traumatic
  experiences, the picture becomes considerably murkier."  page 255

  DISSOCIATION: "Dissociation, rather than repression, might be
  responsible for extensive amnesia in abuse survivors. Dissociation
  refers to a failure to integrate different aspects of an experience,
  with the result that it is difficult to explicitly remember the
  experience. ....Moreover, if people become skilled enough at
  dissociation to develop total amnesia for traumatic experiences, it
  would imply the existence of a dissociative disorder -- a serious
  matter. If they have engaged in extensive dissociation, then
  patients who recover previously forgotten memories involving years
  of horrific abuse should also have a documented history of severe
  pathology that indicates a long-standing dissociative disorder."
  page 262

  ACCURACY: "The current state of scientific evidence concerning the
  accuracy of recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse can be
  summarized easily: there are a few well-documented cases, but little
  scientifically credible information is available." page 267

             Barry Gordon, M.D., Ph.D., Mastermedia, 1996

  This is a book written for a popular audience by a clinician/scholar
who runs a memory lab at Johns Hopkins. The author begins by exposing
some myths about memory. For example: Myth: "People tend to block out
the memory of traumatic childhood events, such as sexual abuse."
Debunked: "Publicly, controversy rages over whether emotional trauma
makes you forget, or remember all too well. But scientifically, there
is little disagreement. People, even children, are all too likely to
remember a traumatic episode. These are not the kinds of memories you
forget. A crisis or stressful situation triggers the 'fight or flight
response,' and the release of hormones such as adrenaline. These
hormones actually help preserve memories, not block them out.
  Of special interest to our readers is chapter 35 in which the author
directly addresses "repressed memories." He provides a very clear
explanation of the problem of false positives within a medical
framework on pages 264-266. Gordon uses an example of a medical test
that has 95 percent accuracy in picking out a disease and only 5
percent in falsely reporting its presence. He asks how well would such
a test do in a healthy population. To answer the question, he assumes
a population of one million people and that one thousand in this
population has the disease. The test will accurately pick up 95% of
them (950 people). That is 95% accuracy. The test will also pick 1 out
of 20 (5%) falsely. In a population of one million that will be 50,000
people falsely diagnoses. Even though this test is 95 percent
accurate, it will falsely 'accuse' more than fifty times as many
people of having the disease as it does identify those people who
actually do have the disease.
  This section concludes, "If we accept statistics which are only
slightly more realistic, then 'recovered memories' become no better at
'identifying' a truly guilty person than the toss of a coin! And if we
believe that 'repressed' memories are actually unusual - if they exist
at all - and that a significant proportion of 'recovered memories' are
false, then many more people are being falsely accused by 'recovered
memories' than are being discovered through them."

                            Joel Paris, MD
            Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 41(4), May 1996

  This article examines the implicit assumptions about trauma as it
relates to memory and therapy. It concludes with recommendations for
clinical practice. "1.  Clinicians should continue to inquire about
traumatic events in childhood... 2.  The most reliable memories of
trauma will have been present throughout the patient's life... 

3. Childhood trauma exists in a larger psychological context... Where
trauma is a factor in a mental disorder, it will be only one of many
factors explaining the pathway to psychopathology."

/                                                                    \ 
|  IMPORTANT: You are not eligible for coverage under our new        |
| professional liability program if one or more of the following     |
| apply to you: ...You use hypnotherapy to assist clients in         |
| recovering failed or repressed memories of possible abuse;         |
|                                                                    |
|                    1996 Professional Insurance Application         |

                             A BIGGER NET

  Research from Australia and Britain indicated that while
expenditures for child abuse have increased greatly in the past
decade, the number of substantiated cases has remained about the same
(FMSF Newsletter, July/August, 1995, p.3). Data from two states, New
Hampshire and South Dakota, appear to show a similar pattern.

               New Hampshire Sunday News, May 12, 1996
                 DCYF Critic Speaks Out by Nancy West

  The Division for Children, Youth and Families in New Hampshire
underwent phenomenal growth from 1985 to 1995. The total budget
increased 865 percent.  During that growth decade, the number of
founded abuse and neglect cases declined from 1,338 in 1986 to 822 in
1994. "DCYF officials insist that doesn't mean that child abuse is
going down."

                      *  Abuse/neglect assessments
                      o  Substantiated cases

              7000|                         * 
                  |                     *   *   *
              6000|                     *   *   *   *
                  |                 *   *   *   *   *
       #      5000|                 *   *   *   *   *
      of          |         *   *   *   *   *   *   *
     cases    4000| *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
                  | *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *    
              3000| *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
                  | *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
              2000| *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
                  | *o  *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
              1000| *o  *o  *o  *   *   *   *o  *   *
                  | *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o
                 0| *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o  *o
                    86  87  88  89  90  91  92  93  94

     (Cases for 1986 through 1991 reflect fiscal year totals.
     1992 through 1994 are by calendar year. A change in policy
     in 1992 resulted in a decrease in assessments involving
     out-of-household perpetrators during subsequent years.)

                   Argus Leader, February 13, 1996
                Bill aims to deter false abuse reports

  Most of the 10,000 reports of child abuse each year in South Dakota
are unsubstantiated. In 1983, one of every two investigations resulted
in a finding of abuse or neglect. In 1994, less than one in five
reported cases was substantiated. While the head of Child Protection
Services says that the statistics indicate that they are doing a
better job, falsely accused parents note how easy it is for a
disgruntled neighbor or bitter ex-spouse to make an accusation.

    _________________CHILD ABUSE IN SOUTH DAKOTA__________________
   /                                                              \
   |     The number of substantiated reports of child abuse is    |
   |   decreasing while the unsubstantiated case are increasing.  |
   |                                                              |
   |    1983 |*****2888*oooo2689o            * Substantiated      |
   |    1984 |*****3023*oooooo3513o          o Unsubstantiated    |
   |    1985 |********3957*ooooooooooo5079o                       |
   |    1986 |**********4606*ooooooooooooo5487o                   |
   |    1987 |**********4579*ooooooooooooooo6107o                 |
   |    1988 |**********4483*ooooooooooooooooo6524o               |
   |    1989 |*********4317*oooooooooooooooooo6862o               |
   |    1990 |*********4132*ooooooooooooooooooo7135o              |
   |    1991 |********3826*oooooooooooooooooooo7379o              |
   |    1992 |*****2903*oooooooooooooooooooo7583o                 |
   |    1993 |***2368*ooooooooooooooooooooo7916o                  |
   |    1994 |*1923*oooooooooooooooooooooo8233o                   |
   |                                                              |
   |   Source: South Dakota Department of Social Services         |

                Anthony R. Quintiliani, Ph.D., NCAC II
         President-Elect of the Vermont Psychological Assoc.

  In a time of controversy about using hypnosis to uncover repressed
memories of childhood sexual abuse, it is in the best interests of
both the psychologist and the patient to follow very strict guidelines
in all memory work related to the psychotherapy of trauma. The burden
of proof for both memory repression and confirmation of reported new
memories of childhood sexual abuse rests with practitioners and the
courts. Although we are far from a final answer, the scientific
evidence against hypnotically refreshed memory and the construct of
repression may surprise you.

  Some studies have demonstrated to a degree that the construct of
repression may exist (Briere & Conte, 1993; Femina et al, 1991; Herman
& Schatzow, 1987; Loftus et al, 1994; and, Williams, 1994). However,
upon closer examination of the studies, either corroborating
documentation that the trauma did occur or documentation of amnesia
remains missing. Self-report, alone, cannot be used scientifically to
document either past trauma or amnesia for it. Some research (Femina,
1991) even supports the fact that survivors of past sexual abuse may
purposely withhold information about either abuse or the memory of
it. In the research literature there appear to be no documented cases
in which both confirmed trauma and long-term complete repression can
be supported empirically.  Van der Kolk, B.A., et al (1996) (Eds.) in
Traumatic Stress, a more scientific presentation by some of the
world's leading experts in the field, promises to summarize current
research and knowledge related to biopsychosocial adaptations to
traumatic stress. Of special interest is their review of memory and
dissociation. Current brain research may present scientific support
for the process of dissociation of traumatic experience.

  If you are using hypnosis (or free association, relaxation training,
visualizations, guided imagery, supportive probing, sculpting,
projective drawing, meditation, dream therapy, primal scream therapy,
family of origin psychodrama, past life regression therapy or other
quasi-hypnotic techniques) to uncover repressed memories of childhood
sexual or physical abuse, you MUST be aware of scientific implications
and developing standards of care. The following information should
stimulate extreme caution in the minds of responsible psychologists
working with repressed memory, memory retrieval and hypnotically
refreshed memory. At the same time, we MUST assist patients coming to
us with such memories, and we MUST use the most effective
psychotherapeutic techniques on their behalf. This dual requirement
implies both an excellent working knowledge of the field of trauma
treatment and use of safe, effective therapeutic techniques. In the
following discussion the word patient is used in both clinical and
legal (i.e., patient witness) conditions.

1. AMA RESEARCH COUNCIL STATEMENT of April, 1985 Scientific status of
refreshing recollection by the use of hypnosis. Journal of the
American Medical Association, 253, (13). - The Council noted that
memories obtained under hypnotic interventions contain confabulations,
pseudomemories and inaccuracies. Self-report, alone, cannot be used to
determine the reliability of true from false memories.

2. KAPLAN & SADOCK (1985)(Eds.). Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry,
IV, Vol 2, 5th Ed., p. 1516.  - Hypnosis not only fails to produce
more accurate memories but also increases the patient's willingness to
report unclear memories as facts. Confabulations, distortions,
fantasies and cued responses all add to the potential unreliability of
such memories.

Salpetriere Hospital, Paris, November, 1992. M. Orne and E. Orne
presented information supporting the fact that hypnotic and many
quasi-hypnotic techniques tend to make retrieved memories unreliable.
The implication may be that hypnotic as well as non-hypnotic
techniques may produce pseudomemories.

4. COBLE, Y.D. (1994). American Medical Association Report of the
Council on Scientific Affairs Re: Memories of Sexual Abuse. - In
recovered memory work it is not yet known how to determine true from
false memories. There is uncertain authenticity in such memories;
therefore, external verification should be used.

Answers about Memories of Childhood Abuse. - This report confirms the
fact that empirical research cannot yet support the existence of
accurate recovered memories of past childhood abuse. The report also
notes the high probability of added pseudoevents and distortions to
recovered memories. Furthermore, the report cautions against making
etiological interpretations of childhood sexual abuse based upon a
single set of symptoms. Therapists who already hold absolute positions
on etiology, repression and false memory syndrome MUST be more
cautions than others who may be more balanced in their views. Lastly,
the report notes that most victims of childhood sexual abuse tend to
remember part or all of what happened to them.

6. PERRY, C. et al (January, 1996). Rethinking per se exclusions of
hypnotically elicited recall as legal testimony. The International
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, XLIV, (1), 66-81. - The
following list implies that hypnotically-induced memory is highly
unreliable. The reasons are: a) Suggestibility increases; 
b) Confabulation increases; c) Confidence in the memory increases; d)
Critical review of the memory decreases; e) Sources of the memory (and
events) are confused; f) Reconstruction increases as a result of new
in-puts; g) Free recall of events may be corrupted; h) Fantasy
development may increase; i) Practitioner's beliefs may influence the
patient; and, j) It is unacceptable as testimony in most state courts.

7. ORNE, M.T. (1979, 1985) Guidelines for the Forensic Use of
Hypnosis. - These guidelines offer some safety in documenting that the
hypnotic intervention did not alter the patient's memory. Some
principles are: a) Videotaping the entire hypnotic process from first
encounter through post-hypnotic contact; b) Documenting pre-hypnotic
reports by initial free recall methods; c) Using independent
documentation to support any changes in the pre-to-post hypnotic
memories; and, d) Document (videotape) the patient's level of
confidence in the memory prior to and after hypnosis.

8. FMS FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER, November/December, 1995. - The totality-
of-circumstances-approach allows the courts to make case-specific
decisions on admitting post-hypnotic testimony. Some criteria are: a)
Could the hypnosis have pressured the patient to describe (or develop)
a coherent story about the events in question?  b) Could suggestions
(about etiology of illness or memory) have influenced the patient's
reported memories? c) Was a pre-hypnotic videotaped record made to
show baseline memory? d) Was the hypnotist/hypnotherapist
appropriately qualified? e) Was there independent corroborating
evidence for events? f) What is the patient's level of hypnotizability
and responsiveness to suggestions?

9. SCHACTER, D. (1996). Searching for Memory: the Brain, the Mind and
the Past.  New York: Basic Books. - In this scientific discussion of
brain processes, mental mechanisms, memory and past life experience
Schacter presents various lines of evidence in support of absolute
caution regarding repressed memory. The interactions involving
scientific brain-mind processes, personal memory and traumatic life
experience do not, apparently, support clinical beliefs that repressed
memories exist.

10. PENDERGRAST, M. (1996 Edn.). Victims of Memory: Sex Abuse
Accusations and Shattered Lives. Hinesburg, Vermont: Upper Access. -
This journalistic review presents a comprehensive critique of
recovered memory therapy. A key conclusion is that incidents and
details of sexual abuse can be forgotten and recalled later, but that
"massive repression" (in which years of trauma are completely
forgotten) probably does not exist.

11. COHEN, L. et al. (1995) (Eds.). Dissociative Identity Disorder:
Theoretical and Treatment Controversies. Northvale, NJ.: Jason
Aronson. - This comprehensive text presents varied opinions in support
of DID and repressed memory processes.  However, it also presents some
very strong critiques. The clash of ideas is very helpful.

12. YAPKO, M.D. (1994). Suggestions of Abuse: True and False Memories
of Childhood Sexual Trauma. New York: Simon and Schuster. - This book
offers a good clinical review of the necessary cautions required in
traumatic memory work. Of special value is the review's overall
listing of how memory can be influenced, especially by hypnosis and
other clinical interventions.

13. D. CORYDON HAMMOND et al.(1995). Clinical Hypnosis and Memory:
Guidelines for Clinicians and for Forensic Hypnosis. - American
Society of Clinical Hypnosis Press. This contribution offers practical
recommendations to clinicians using hypnosis in repressed memory
work. Noted recommendations to clinicians include: a) clinical license
and appropriate training required; b) no leading questions; 
c) documented informed consent (especially regarding imperfection of
memory and legal limits on use of hypnotically recovered memory); 
d) mixed reliability of dissociation and prior suggestions with high
hypnotizables; f) need for corroborating evidence; g) affect intensity
does not imply truth in memories; h) hypnotic memory is not more
accurate than conscious awareness; i) dissociative age regression may
distort memory; j) balance support, empathy and scientific information
in treatment of self-reported, repressed memory of trauma; and, 
k) litigation and confrontation against an alleged perpetrator should
not be encouraged, especially if hypnosis was used without
corroborating evidence of events.

I hope this review is helpful to you in your clinical work. Provide
the most effective and safe services possible; however, it is your
responsibility to be competent in this complex field.


  The most reliable information currently available about
professionals' beliefs and practices on the use of hypnosis and
hypnotic techniques for recovering memories comes from a study by
Poole, Lindsay, Memon, and Bull, J of Counseling and Clinical
Psychology, 1995 Vol 63, No3. 426-437, "Psychotherapy and the Recovery
of Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: U.S. and British Practitioners'
Opinions, Practices, and Experiences."

  "A survey regarding clients' memories of childhood sexual abuse was
sent to licensed U.S. doctoral-level psychotherapists (Survey 1 & 2,
n=145) and British psychologists (Survey 2, n=57). Respondents listed
a wide variety of behavioral symptoms as potential indicators of CSA
and 71% indicated that they had used various techniques (e.g.
hypnosis, interpretation of dreams) to help clients recover suspected
memories of CSA."

      Technique            Using             Disapproving
                      US-1  US-2   GB      US-1  US-2   GB

      Hypnosis         29    34     5       27    33    44
      Age regression   19    17     7       35    33    46
      Dream imagery    44    37    25       26    28    40
      Guided imagery   26    32    14       34    31    31
      Imagination      11    22    18       44    24    22
      Family photos    47    32    29       13    13    13
      Journaling       50    29    32       18    35    25
      Physical         36    36    37       25    24    20

"Across samples, 25% of the respondents reported a constellation of
beliefs and practices suggestive of a focus on memory recovery, and
these psychologists reported relatively high rates of memory recovery
in their clients."

                             BOOK REVIEW

          Psychoanalytic Dialogues v.6 no.2 (1996): 151-294
                 Reviewer: Michael G. Kenny, D. Phil.

  This 'Symposium on False Memory' takes the form of papers by two
associate editors of Psychoanalytic Dialogues -- Drs. Adrienne Harris
and Jody Messlet Davies -- with commentaries by C. Brooks Brenneis, an
analyst with a skeptical view of recovered memory, Donnel B. Stern who
takes a supportive position, and Frederick Crews, who questions
psychoanalysis in all its forms and should be no stranger to the
present readership.
  The editor of Dialogues, Stephen A. Mitchell, sets the agenda in his
Introduction, noting that the primary authors "attempt to address
complex problems of epistemology, therapeutics, and clinical
responsibility." They are grappling with the problem of memory, more
specifically memories of sexual abuse, as encountered by analysts in
their clinical practice. Behind the practice lie theoretical
ambiguities about the relation between truth and fantasy that have
been present since Freud's rejection of the seduction hypothesis.
  The type of relational analytic therapy at issue here is intensive,
long-term, and highly sensitive to problems stemming from transference
and counter-transference: the reading of past patterns of interaction
into the present therapeutic relationship. This intimate dialogue
between clinician and patient is also the focus of outside suspicions
about the genesis of confabulated memories. The contributions of
Harris and Davies reflect the tension implicit in a changing practice
that, instead of emphasizing an exact recovery of what really
happened, now focuses on "the constructed nature of memory and a
narrative view of the past." How is one to walk the line between
constructivism, the real-world unhappiness of one's patients, and
knowledge of the reality of sexual abuse? Dr. Davies asks herself:
"how do we reconcile a belief in the primary pathogeneity of [abuse]
with an equally strong belief in the essentially constructivist nature
of the psychoanalytic process (p. 207)?"  As the Symposium shows, it
isn't easy.
  Harris observes that "in this climate of highly politicized and
polarized discussion of true versus false, remembered versus created
and constructed, it is extremely hard to find a position morally,
ethically and intellectually comfortable from which to do clinical
work" (p. 160). All contributors agree that memory is not a clear-cut
function, and that it is shaped by the circumstances in which the past
is brought alive in the present. The psychoanalytic encounter is one
of these, and our authors are well aware of it.  They agree that the
past is to some extent a social construct, but question whether
therapists have the capacity to induce the fabrication of just any
past.  If not, what is the relation between past reality as it is
presently construed, and what "what really happened" back then?
Difficult issues to be sure.
  These issues were brought into focus by what the authors
characterize as the 'False Memory Syndrome Movement,' which they
regard as having grossly caricatured the nature of analytic practice
by emphasizing a "reductive and skewed picture" of the nature of
repression and memory at the expense of a nuanced clinically-based
account of the complex effects of abuse (p. 165).  Nonetheless, the
authors are attuned to some of the difficulties here: the influence of
leading questions on children's testimony, the social dynamics of
memory formation within families, the possibility of iatrogenic
suggestion, the fact that "difficulties with suggestibility are
particularly acute with people who have a history of abuse" (p. 180).
  Harris's and Davies's solution to these problems takes two forms:
(1) defusing the false memory critique by calling into question the
relevance to clinical reality of the experimental work on memory done
by cognitive psychologists like Elizabeth Loftus, and (2) emphasizing
the known reality of abuse, recent research on Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, and the capacity of analysis to uncover the dysfunctional
relational patterns ultimately due to familial abuse.  Dr. Harris
takes on the first task, while Davies takes on the second.
  Harris asks why research on eyewitness testimony has come to
dominate the discourse of the critics: why positivist psychological
experiments are taken to be an essential guide to a truth which in
principle is complex, murky, and not easily mapped through
oversimplified laboratory research. As an anthropologist attuned to
work on complex phenomena in real-world settings, I have a certain
sympathy for this point of view, but doubt that psychoanalysis --
though certainly complex -- is any better situated in this respect
than cognitive psychology.
  On the one hand Harris attacks the positivism of Loftus, while on
the other Davis draws on Bessel van der Kolk's neuropsychology as a
legitimizing strategy to affirm the reality of dissociated memory (and
is called a "closet positivist" by Crews for doing so). She believes
herself to be articulating psychoanalysis and current trauma research;
what I think she has actually done is to accept carte blanche (as have
many others) van der Kolk's "groundbreaking work on the
neurophysiology of trauma" (p. 288) as a factual account of the nature
of traumatic amnesia. In my view van der Kolk's so called
groundbreaking work is a very shaky and metaphorical structure shot
through with 'maybes, probablys, and coulds' presented in a haze of
scientistic jargon. As far as I can tell, van der Kolk's therapeutic
practice is no less psychoanalytic in its method than that of Harris
and Davies, and therefore subject to the same caveats and doubts that
our authors apply to their own work.
  Be that as it may, Davies's essay exhibits a tension between
positivistic neuroscience and psychoanalytic hermeneutics. There are
in fact important issues here; Harris, more attuned than Davies to
contemporary social theory and philosophy, is especially sensitive to
this background influence. She observes that "positivism or some
conviction that the analyst does have independent access to
verification would be a relief" (p. 178); but it is a relief that
Harris can't allow herself in the face of "the most terrible known in
this debate; the importance of and epistemological shakiness of
reality confirmation and validation" (p. 277). And yet she says that
"psychoanalysis is about remembering" (272).
  Harris and Davies do not think that their fundamental task is to
recover specific memories, but rather to get inside the relational
world of their clients on the assumption that past dysfunctional
patterns affect present behavior in ways that are unknown to the
patient, and in this sense unconscious.  I do not find this
controversial in itself. However, problems arise when one considers
the methods used to access these patterns, as seen most particularly
in Davies's assertion that they will, if all goes well, reveal
themselves as they really are in the transference/counter-transference
relationship. This is a big claim, one buttressed by reference to van
der Kolk's assertion that traumatic memories may still be there as
fresh as when first laid down -- "state dependent memories of
formative interactive representations" (p. 197).
  There are other issues here that I cannot fully address in a review,
but I will identify two that are worthy of further attention: (1)
continued invocation of the slippery and trendy concept of
'dissociation' -- an odd-job word that evades precise definition, and
(2) the problems that Harris identifies concerning how memories are
actually formed via communicative practices within families and
elsewhere that "may leave the child utterly at sea as to what
happened, why, and how to keep an orderly narrative of who did what to
whom and why." The job of analysis is to help unscramble all that, to
produce an orderly narrative, "an integration of thought and feeling"
(p. 177). This is no easy task in the face of presumptive dissociative
processes that decouple feelings, emotions, images, dreams, and
thoughts to produce a life lived in poorly articulated fragments. The
concept of 'dissociation' allows for an account of how and why such
fragmentation has occurred, but as said it is a slippery notion. It
can mean experience that was never verbalized at all (cf. Stern, p.
254), or experiences that are kept in separate compartments because
they are cognitively incommensurable (this me loves father, that one
hates him), or state-dependent memories that are neurochemically
encoded in a different manner than normal memory. It's a
muddle. However, I would point out that, if Freud taught us anything,
it is that family life is a muddle as well -- a melange of conflicting
desires and contrasting perspectives. Our authors observe that their
patients are often full of self-doubt about what really happened. As
well they might be, especially when memories are vague or only
recently surfacing, or with patients who conclude from the media that
they might have been abused.
  As for the commentators, Dr. Brenneis, drawing on his own clinical
experience, examines the logic potentially leading to the invalid
conclusion that because certain symptoms are manifest in the present
then trauma can be assumed to have occurred in the past. He doubts
that Harris and Davies have successfully dealt with the problem of
tacit influence in psychoanalytic practice, stating that "we cannot, I
think, escape the possibility that memory of early abuse may be
created within the therapeutic dyad" (p. 227). Donnel Stern is much
more sanguine than Harris about the capacity of a
relationally-oriented psychoanalysis to arrive at something like
truth. He does not think that constructivism implies relativism
(263). Frederick Crews, on the other hand, finds nothing of value in
any of this, and most in particularly Davies's claim to be able to
access dissociated relational patterns through the
transference/counter-transference process. In fine rhetorical fettle,
he observes that "self-evidently, such a miasma cannot be expected to
yield any nuggets of corroborated fact" (p. 244). Crews also targets
what he calls "sexual politics," and regards the concept of
'dissociation' as an ideologically motivated dodge to get around the
'masculinist' implications of the Freudian notion of repression. His
final advice is that psychoanalysts would be well advised to stay away
from the recovered memory movement.
  Our authors provide a measured response to the commentaries. Davies
says that though relational psychoanalysis does not reveal 'the
truth,' the truth can be approached "asymptotically." It can be
identified when the patient improves as it is revealed. She finds that
"it is hard to believe that simply cocreating an interesting and
plausible narrative that had no relationship to an actual lived past"
could bring about the changes for the better witnessed in analytic
practice (p. 293). Harris regards Crews's juxtaposition of
'masculinist repression' and 'feminist dissociation' as simply 'goofy'
(276), while accepting that a central problem in this entire debate is
the "difficult problem of the subtle, apparently benign pulls for
compliance and power of suggestion in even the most principled and
reflective conduct of psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic practice"
  All told an interesting and provocative exchange. Readers would be
well advised to obtain it for themselves and think about it. Among
other things it tells much about the current state of our intellectual
culture, its doubts, anxieties, and epistemological uncertainties.

  Michael G. Kenny, D. Phil. is a professor in the Department of
  Sociology and Anthropology at Simon Fraser University. He is the
  author of "The Passion of Ansel Bourne: Multiple Personality in
  American Culture."  

                             LEGAL CORNER
                              FMSF Staff
    (Florez v. Gomez and Duncan v. Moonshadow (Consolidated) 1996
                 Ariz. LEXIS 59, decision 5/16/ 1996)

  The Arizona Supreme Court held that two suits for sexual abuse
brought by adults some two decades after the alleged events were
barred by the statute of limitations. The court ruled that a diagnosis
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was insufficient to
constitute insanity or "unsound mind" under Arizona Statute and
thereby extend the period within which the suit could be filed.
  [Footnote: The purpose of so-called insanity or disability
  exceptions to the state statute of limitations is to provide extra
  time to a person who could not sue because they were mentally
  incompetent and/or unable to understand their legal rights.  Arizona
  statute A.R.S.$A412-502(A) provides "if a person entitled to bring
  an at the time the cause of action accrues...of unsound
  mind, the period of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of
  the period limited for commencement of the action."]
The court further held that expert affidavits that offer conclusions
without setting out "relevant foundation" do not support a legal
finding of "unsound mind."
  In one of the suits, claimant Gomez alleged that a priest had
molested him when he was about 12 years old, some 16 years earlier.
Gomez argued that he had repressed the memories until 1990. He also
stated that he "wasn't ready to come up and talk about it..." and that
he had not made the connection between the alleged abuse and his
psychological problems until recently. He also claimed he had been
unable to file earlier because he was of "unsound mind," and offered
support through an expert affidavit that he was of "unsound mind"
because he had dropped out of high school, moved frequently,
squandered his money, and suffered from depression and stress.
  In the second suit considered by the court, claimant Moonshadow
alleged sexual abuse of the most "perverse and criminal sort" by her
father from age 6-17 over two decades prior to filing. She claimed
that she was always aware of the abuse but had suffered from PTSD
which had prevented her from bringing the suit in time.
  Each of these suits would be dismissed as time barred unless the
limitations period were extended under the Arizona disability
statute. The court noted that while neither Gomez nor Moonshadow claim
to be insane or incompetent, they argue that their PTSD is sufficient
to extend the limitations period. Following a review of Arizona law,
the court held that the focus of the unsound mind inquiry is on a
plaintiff's ability to manage his or her ordinary daily affairs.
  [Footnote: The Supreme Court concluded that the definition of
  unsound mind developed in the Arizona Court of Appeals is consistent
  with cases in other jurisdictions such that no state has found a
  diagnosis of PTSD alone sufficient to constitute unsound mind within
  the meaning of the relevant statute.  In addition to the decisions
  cited by the Arizona Supreme Court, an FMSF Working Paper, Chapter
  VII.1 on the Disability Exception, also explores this question.] 
It does not depend on the plaintiff's ability to pursue the legal
matter at issue.
  The court ruled that while the expert affidavits presented by
Gomez's and Moonshadow's treating psychologists set forth conclusions,
they are insufficient to support a legal finding of "unsound mind."
The court held that "simply attaching the PTSD label to a person's
symptoms is insufficient to satisfy the...definition of unsound mind.
...An expert affidavit opposing a motion for summary judgment must set
forth 'specific facts' to support an opinion...The affidavits here are
not objectionable because they embrace an ultimate issue, but because
they are without relevant foundation....The affidavits confuse the
inability to bring an action with the inability to perform basic
functions of human existence."
  [Footnote: The court also noted that if the facts listed in the
  expert affidavit from Gomez' therapist (including moving frequently
  and squandering money) "were sufficient to support a legal finding
  of 'unsound mind,' then all those who have less than satisfactory
  lives would be of 'unsound mind.'"]
  Referring to a recent Michigan Supreme Court decision 
the Arizona court stated that "hard evidence that a person is simply
incapable of carrying on the day-to-day affairs of human existence
...are empirical facts easily verifiable and more difficult to
fabricate than a narrow claim of inability to bring the action."
  [Footnote: Lemmerman v. Fealk, 449 Mich. 56, 534 N.W.2d 695 Mich.
The problems with recovery of memories of childhood sexual abuse which
the AMA described as "of uncertain authenticity" were also noted by
this court.
  [Footnote: Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs, American
  Medical Association, Memories of Childhood Abuse, CSA Report
The court reemphasized in its conclusion that "the legislature enacted
statutes of limitations in order to protect against the nightmare of
stale claims....It is not for us to enlarge the category of unsound
mind through interstitial judicial lawmaking."


  The confidentiality, or privilege, granted to clients which
restricts access to their therapy records originates both from state
statutes and common law.  While all states have passed statutes
granting a certain degree of privilege in this area, most state and
federal courts have, on a case-by-case basis, found it necessary to
balance the need for confidentiality with Constitutional due process
  [Footnote: For a discussion of representative case law and the
  numerous legislative and judicial exceptions to patient-therapist
  privilege, see, e.g., Loftus, E.F., Paddock, J.R., Guernsey,
  T.F. (1996) "Patient-Psychotherapist privilege: Access to clinical
  records in the tangled web of repressed memory litigation,"
  University of Richmond Law Review, 30:109-154.  This article also
  discusses the privilege question in relation to third party suits.
  See also, FMSF Publication, Working Paper Chapter XI.]
It appears that in many states, while privilege is recognized, it is
not absolute and exceptions exist. Courts allowing exceptions to
privilege have devised numerous safeguards to ensure the privacy of
the individual where possible, while at the same time granting access
to relevant records.
  The issue in lawsuits based on claims of recovered repressed
memories revolves around whether the allegations refer to actual
events or are confabulation and the product of suggestion. As
Elizabeth Loftus, et. al., point out, "To defend successfully against
these allegations, one must have access to the clinical record to
evaluate the extent to which the therapy process itself may have
created a complex web of unsubstantiated or unverifiable memories and
beliefs about prior life events."
  [Footnote: Loftus, E.F.,, (1996) Ibid., p. 111.] 
  Privilege in repressed memory claims may be overcome due to several
characteristics of the claim. For example, a plaintiff alleging
repression of childhood abuse necessarily has the burden of proving
the elements of the claim.  To sufficiently meet this burden, the
plaintiff may need to produce documentation of the manner in which he
or she came to discover the alleged abuse. Such evidence may include
the therapist's notes and observations. Under these circumstances,
where the plaintiff relies on the relevant documentation, the
patient-client privilege may be waived.
  In addition, the plaintiff in repressed memory cases typically
claims psychological damages as a result of the alleged abuse. In many
jurisdictions, there is an exception to the patient-therapist
privilege where the psychological state of the plaintiff is put into
  Some jurisdictions have mandated that the court be informed where
proffered testimony had been the subject of hypnosis. The use of
therapeutic intervention involving hypnosis or hypnotic-like
techniques may limit privilege in jurisdictions which employ a
case-by-case evaluation of the impact of hypnosis on the reliability
and, thus, the admissibility of the hypnotically enhanced memory.
  A recent ruling in a repressed memory case illustrates the classic
tension between the privacy rights of the individual and the
defendant's due process rights. As the defense in Hungerford pointed
out in a motion for discovery of therapy records, "If this matter were
ever to be before a trier of fact, not only must the defense argue
that the incidents in the repressed memories did not occur, but the
defendant must also be prepared to address the jury's question that if
these memories are untrue, how did they occur?" The Hungerford court's
ruling followed a pre-trial evidentiary hearing which considered the
reliability of the theory of repression, and the process by which they
had been "recovered."
  [Footnote: State v. Hungerford, No. 94-5-45, 1995 WL 378571
  (N.H. Sup. Ct., May 23, 1995), Memorandum of Law Supporting
  Defendant's Second Motion for Discovery and Motion for Depositions.]
The court concluded that the techniques used were "highly suggestive"
and "thoroughly and systematically violated the guidelines and
standards of practice of psychotherapy."

             in Federal Court Jaffee v. Redmond, et. al.,
            1996 U.S. LEXIS 3879, decision June 13, 1996.

  On June 13, 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on whether federal
courts should respect the confidentiality of mental health counseling
records by giving psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers a
specific privilege against having to disclose patient records in
judicial proceedings.
  In the case before the U.S. Supreme Court, Mary Lu Redmond, a
Chicago policewoman was sued for wrongful death by the family of a
suspect, Rickey Allen, whom she shot and killed as he was allegedly
about to stab another man with a butcher knife. Since there was a
factual disagreement as to when policewoman Redmond drew her gun and
whether the man she shot was armed and threatening a third man, the
family of Allen sought to compel a clinical social worker to reveal
what officer Redmond had said in counseling sessions after the
shooting. Officer Redmond had entered therapy to "work out the pain
and anguish undoubtedly caused by Allen's death."
  In 1993, a federal judge ruled the records of a social worker are
not protected under federal privilege laws and that private
discussions between Redmond and social worker Karen Beyer were to be
disclosed. The 7th Circuit court ruled it was time to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege because "reason tells us that
psychotherapists and patients share a unique relationship, in which
the patient's ability to communicate freely without the fear of public
disclosure is the key to successful treatment."
  In their appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, relatives of the dead man
argued that the appeals court created such a broad privilege that
their ability to prove their case at the new trial would be impeded.
  The U.S. Supreme Court based its ruling on Federal Rule of Evidence
501 which authorizes the courts to define new privileges, and on
Trammel v. United States 445 U.S. 40, 63 L.Ed.2d 186, which states
that exception from the general rule disfavoring privilege is
justified when the proposed privilege "promotes sufficiently important
interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence."  at 51
  The majority opinion written by Justice Stevens held that
psychotherapists' privilege serves private as well as public
interests. "Effective psychotherapy depends upon an atmosphere of
confidence and trust, and therefore the mere possibility of disclosure
may impede development of the relationship necessary for successful
treatment." (citing studies reviewed in briefs by the Am.  Psychiatric
Assn. and the Am. Psychological Assn).
  [Footnote: In fact 14 amicus briefs were filed which support the
  granting of privilege.  They were submitted by organizations
  including the Am. Psychiatric Assn., the Am. Psychoanalytic Assn.,
  the Am. Assn. of State Social Work Boards, the Am. Counseling Assn.,
  the Natl Assn. of Social Workers. ]
The court specifically extended privilege to social workers, stating
that social workers now provide a significant amount of mental health
treatment and their clients often include the poor and those of modest
  The court bolstered its conclusion that a federal privilege was
called for by citing the fact that all 50 states have codified some
form of privilege for mental health workers in state statutes.
However, the dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia not only argued
against the logic of that reasoning, but pointed out that, "No state
has adopted the privilege without restriction; the nature of the
restrictions varies enormously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; and
10 States, I reiterate, effectively reject the privilege [to social
workers] entirely."
  The majority opinion did not address the special circumstances which
many state and federal courts had recognized might lead to exceptions
to privilege.  In reviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
Jaffee, the majority specifically declared, "We part company with the
Court of Appeals on a separate point. We reject the balancing
component of the privilege implemented by that court and a small
number of States. Making the promise of confidentiality contingent
upon trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the
patient's interest in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure
would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege....If the purpose
of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential
conversation must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely
varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all."
  Following this statement the majority did, however, in a footnote
allow that "there are situations in which the privilege must give way,
for example, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others
can be averted only by means of disclosure by the therapist."
  Parallel to its reliance on FRE 501, the majority quoted from the
Senate Report accompanying the 1975 adoption of the Rules of Evidence,
which also recognized that Rule 501 "should be understood as
reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a
confidential relationship...should be determined on a case-by-case
basis." It should be pointed out that following the majority statement
rejecting "the balancing component of the privilege," Justice Stevens
continued by saying, "A rule that authorizes the recognition of new
privileges on a case-by-case basis makes it appropriate to define the
details of new privileges in a like manner. Because this is the first
case in which we have recognized a psychotherapist privilege, it is
neither necessary nor feasible to delineate its full contours in a way
that would govern all conceivable future questions in this area."
  We will conclude with the remarks of Justice Scalia (dissenting
opinion) who questioned whether the cost to truth and justice were
truly justified in granting absolute privilege to psychotherapists:
"The Court has discussed at some length the benefit that will be
purchased by creation of the evidentiary privilege in this case: the
encouragement of psychoanalytic counseling. It has not mentioned the
purchase price: occasional injustice. That is the cost of every rule
which excludes reliable and probative evidence -- or at least every
one categorical enough to achieve its announced policy objective. In
the case of some of these rules, such as the one excluding confessions
that have not been properly 'Mirandized'..., the victim of the
injustice is always the impersonal State or the faceless 'public at
large.' For the rule proposed here, the victim is more likely to be
some individual who is prevented from proving a valid claim -- or
(worse still) prevented from establishing a valid defense. The latter
is particularly unpalatable for those who love justice, because it
causes the courts of law not merely to let stand a wrong, but to
become themselves the instruments of wrong."

                            Editor's note
  The admissibility of expert opinion testimony that certain
  psychological characteristics or behaviors are consistent with a
  history of past sexual abuse has been an issue in many child sexual
  abuse cases.
    [Footnote: See, e.g., Askowitz, L.R. and Graham, M.H. (1994) "The
    reliability of expert psychological testimony in child sexual
    abuse prosecutions," 15 Cardozo L. Rev.  2027. See also, FMSF
    Publication #825 and Working Papers Chapter IV and Chapter XIX.]
  Most courts have not allowed testimony which offers the expert's
  conclusions on the question before the jury, i.e., whether the
  abuse, in fact, occurred. Some recent decisions, after finding that
  the basis of the expert testimony regarding so-called syndrome
  evidence is insufficiently reliable, have refused to admit the
  testimony for any purpose.  Where admitted, the purpose of such
  testimony is generally limited to 1) providing the jury with
  information about characteristics of sexually abused individuals
  based on expertise the lay jury may not have; 2) bolstering the
  credibility of the complaining witness where the jury might
  otherwise negatively infer their testimony was impeached by certain
  psychological characteristics or behaviors.  A recent Canadian
  decision contributes to sound judicial thought in this area.

                         ONTARIO CANADA COURT 
                 Regina v. Wakabayashi, Ontario Court 
    (General Division), No. CRIM (J) 4055/93, ruling May 1, 1996. 
             (Ruling available as FMSF Brief Bank #103.)

  In a recent decision (5/1/96), Ontario Justice J. Langdon rejected
many earlier formulations of the admissibility question as logically
inconsistent and legally prejudicial. Justice Langdon states that
while he had initially acceded to the admissibility of expert opinion
that certain behaviors are consistent with a past history of sexual
abuse, he consented to revisit the issue on motion by defense attorney
Alan Gold of Toronto, Canada. The court considered the motion to limit
the admissibility of expert opinion testimony in a criminal case in
which defendant Wakabayashi was accused of sexual abuse of his 2 young
stepchildren from 1971-1981.
  The anticipated expert testimony would include statements about
behaviors of the two complainants which included: "acting out,
especially running away, conflict with parental authority, acts of
self harm,...abuse of alcohol and drugs, promiscuous sexual behaviour,
dissociative episodes, late disclosure of alleged sexual abuse..."
Justice Langdon noted that such behaviors may lead a jury to reason
that the complainants are troubled persons and that as a consequence
their evidence ought to be treated with caution or perhaps rejected.
The ruling made it clear that this credibility problem remains
regardless of whether there is an "explanation" for it. In fact,
Justice Langdon noted, "In order for the 'explanation' (that the
behaviour(s) are consistent with a history of sexual abuse) to have
any meaning and hence any impact on the jury's assessment of the
complainant's credibility, the jury must find that the complainant was
sexually abused....What could be more prejudicial than erroneously
assuming the guilt of the accused?...It is illogical to reason that
the past history of sexual abuse explains away the lack of
credibility; it does not. Whatever the cause, the witness remains
troubled and his or her credibility must be assessed accordingly." In
addition, the court found that the admission of such testimony would
be of "great prejudice in the sense that it would almost certainly be
misused by the jury." (emphasis in original)
  Justice Langdon also concluded that there were logical errors in the
assertion that "particular behaviors [are] consistent with a history
of past sexual abuse." The court noted that to be of assistance to the
jury, one must also know what behaviors are consistent with not having
been abused or with a person who was not sexually abused but who
falsely claims he was. Otherwise the proffered testimony is "utterly
without probative value." The court provided the example of expert
testimony regarding CSAAS: "If the child delayed disclosure, that was
consistent with the syndrome. If he or she did not, well that was not
necessarily inconsistent with the syndrome. Similarly if the child
recanted after disclosing; but if the child did not recant, it did not
indicate that his or her claim was false. In short, the syndrome was a
crutch which handily supported any witness whose testimony betrayed
obvious weaknesses but was incapable of discrediting a similar witness
whose testimony did not. It had no other effect than to assist
witnesses for the prosecution."
  The court also noted that several of attorney Gold's arguments were
persuasive: that the expert had relied on authorities which had not
been subjected to peer review and were not in themselves reliable;
that a number of learned articles argue that there are no behavioral
identifiers of persons who have been sexually abused; and that there
are no studies of behaviors which are "consistent with a history of
not having been sexually abused but now falsely claiming to the
contrary." Justice Langdon stated, however, that "without, myself,
donning the mantle of an expert" he could not, at the time, decide
that issue. By the reasoning given above, the court ruled the
proffered expert opinion would not be admitted.

              (Tuman v. Genesis Associates,, 1996 
     U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5406 (Memorandum and Order, April 25, 1996)

  The parents of Diane Tuman initiated this third-party suit in Sept.
1994, alleging that they had entered into a contract with their
daughter's therapists to treat their daughter, then 20 years old, for
bulimia and other emotional problems. Plaintiffs claim that during the
time the defendants treated Diane from 1990 to 1992, they negligently
implanted false memories in Diane that her parents had sexually
assaulted her and routinely performed bizarre satanic rituals,
including murdering children. Plaintiffs also claim that Diane's
mental condition deteriorated significantly under treatment by the
defendants, Genesis Associates and its principals, Patricia
A. Neuhausel, a licensed social worker and certified addiction
counselor and Patricia A. Mansmann, a licensed psychologist.
  In July 1995, the judge in this case dismissed 2 of the Plaintiff's
causes of action but allowed 6 others to remain against the 3
defendants for negligence, breach of contract, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, misrepresentation, and punitive
  [Footnote: See report in FMSF Newsletter, Sept. 1995.]
The judge ruled that a therapist may owe a duty of reasonable care to
a patient's parents under certain circumstances.
  On April 25, 1996, Judge John R. Padova revisited the issue on a
more recent motion for summary judgment. The court did not dismiss the
claims against Neuhausel and Genesis Associates for negligence, breach
of contract, intentional misrepresentation and punitive damages, but
did enter a summary judgment in their favor on the intentional
infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims. The court also
granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Mansmann on all causes
of action, citing several reasons, including the fact that she never
specifically treated Diane.
  The court refused to dismiss the suit as time barred, holding that
the date at which it was reasonable for the Plaintiffs to have first
discovered that they had been injured by the Defendant's actions was
not necessarily the date they first discovered the defendants'
treatment was harmful to their daughter and that both dates were under
  The court also rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs'
negligence claim must fail because Pennsylvania courts only recognize
a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in
so-called "bystander" cases (i.e., situations in which the plaintiff
actually observes the defendant injure a close relative). Judge Padova
noted that Pennsylvania also recognizes recovery in situations in
which there is a contractual or fiduciary duty and, therefore,
predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would allow plaintiffs
who establish a reasonable duty of care to recover damages for
emotional distress caused by the breach of that duty. However, Judge
Padova, reiterating his July 1995 opinion, noted that plaintiffs would
still be required to show that they were owed a duty by defendants
which would be satisfied by showing: 1) the therapist specifically
undertook to treat the child for the parents; 2) the parents relied
upon the therapist; 3) the therapist was aware of the parents'
reliance; 4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the parents would be
harmed by the therapist's conduct. 894 F.Supp. at 188.
  The court further held that because the record showed that a fact
finder could reasonably conclude that plaintiffs had formed an oral
contract with defendants, plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract
could not be defeated on summary judgment motion.
  It should be noted, especially in light of the recent U.S. Supreme
Court ruling in Jaffee v. Redmond (reported elsewhere in this
Newsletter), that, despite the fact that plaintiffs' expert did not
have access to Diane's treatment records, plaintiffs were successful
in defeating defendants' motion to exclude the opinion of plaintiffs'
expert who was to testify that defendants' treatment deviated from the
standard of care. After examining the record, the court held that
plaintiffs' expert had sufficient alternative sources of information
upon which the expert could have reasonably based his opinion and
defendants may cross-examine the expert about the basis of his opinion
at trial.
  Settlement negotiations were entered into prior to trial which had
been scheduled for May 20, 1996. However, as of the date of this
writing, no formal settlement agreement has been reached.

       Seattle Post-Intelligencer by Ellis E. Conklin 5/21/1996

  A Washington State hypnotherapist will pay a $700,000 settlement to
a former patient who caused a fatal car accident after becoming
convinced that members of a satanic cult were pursuing her.
  Patricia Rice, 51, went to hypnotherapist Gina Gamage in 1992,
seeking help to lose weight and stop smoking. Instead, memories of
sexual abuse by satanists were implanted through hypnosis, say her
Seattle attorneys Rebecca Roe and Kristin Houser. Rice said she came
to believe the cult was targeting her because she had "remembered"
what it had done. In June 1992 she drove around Oregon for two days
believing that the cult members were closing in on her. She caused a
head-on collision when she drove across the center line into oncoming
traffic, all the while believing that a "good witch" was
"telepathically directing her to safety." Rice was tried for
first-degree manslaughter of the man who died in the accident and was
found "guilty but insane." Although currently free and in therapy,
Rice will be under the supervision and control of the court and the
Oregon Psychiatric Security Review Board for 20 years.
  The settlement with her former therapist was reached in a daylong
mediation session about six weeks before Gamage was to have gone to
trial to face Rice's allegations of negligent and harmful therapy.
Under the terms of the settlement, Rice will receive from Gamage's
insurance company $425,000, plus $1570 a month for the rest of her
life. The name of Gamage's insurance carrier is being withheld from
court records as one condition of the settlement.
  Gamage continues to practice in Vancouver, Washington. Rice's
attorneys note that there is no licensing process in Washington for
hypnotherapists. They need only register with the state.
                            Editor's note:
  The FMSF Legal Task Force is tracking the progress of over 10
  malpractice claims which are expected to settle by the end of July.
  Attorney Don Eisner, of Encino Calif. commented that from his
  experience, insurance companies are now more willing to settle
  malpractice suits by former patients alleging implantation of false
  memories. In the more than half dozen cases his firm is involved
  with, insurance companies appear to be defending mainly on technical
  or procedural grounds and are reluctant to defend on the merits of
  the case. Eisner notes that for defendant therapists, it is
  increasingly difficult to find an expert to testify that memory
  recovery therapy meets an established standard of care or that a
  belief in childhood ritual abuse experiences is justified.


  In April, 1996 a summary judgment motion was granted in a case
brought by Deborah David against numerous California mental health
  David had originally entered therapy for depression after surgery.
She was told by her therapist that she was suffering from repressed
memories of having been sexually and ritually molested as a child and
was subsequently referred to other therapists who specialized in such
  Two of the five defendants David originally sued for malpractice
settled out of court within the past year. In the April 1996 ruling,
the court held that David should have known of her injury on the date
she left therapy in April 1992.
  [Footnote: The dismissal was based on California statute of
  limitations (Cal Civ Proc 340.5) which applies only to medical
  professionals. The statute of limitations states that a medical
  negligence lawsuit must be brought within three years of when the
  injury occurred and within one year of when the plaintiff knew or
  should have known that he/she was a victim of a medical malpractice.]
At the time she left therapy, David had no understanding that her
memories were false. In fact, she was extremely upset with her
therapist because he would not continue recovered memory therapy and
made derogatory and negative statements about him to the effect that
he had ruined her life. Over one year later, she came to realize that
the memories of abuse had been implanted by the therapy process and
were not valid. She then brought her suit. The theory of the defense
on the summary judgment motion was that at the time that she was
disgruntled with her primary therapist and left therapy, regardless of
the reason, she was on notice that something was wrong and had a duty
to contact experts to discover the extent of her cause of action.
  David's attorney Patrick Clancy of Walnut Creek, Calif. states that
this dismissal appears to be unique to the State of California and
unique to the judge who ruled on the summary judgment motion.

            Seattle Times by Ronald K. Fitten June 8, 1996

  A King County Superior Court jury awarded more than $500,000 to a
man who said a state agency's negligent investigation of child sex-
abuse allegations against him severed his relationship with his
daughter and destroyed his relationship with his wife. He claimed that
CPS caseworkers were biased in their investigation, that they never
talked to him and that they made little effort to check into problems
in the household of the woman who reported the allegations. As a
result, his daughter was traumatized and would need ongoing therapy,
he was falsely labeled a child molester, and had to spend thousands of
dollars in legal fees trying to clear himself of the false allegations
and reunite with his daughter.
  The case began in 1992 when the mother of a 4-year-old friend of the
defendant's daughter reported to CPS that both girls told her he had
sexually abused them. Janet Keen, a social worker who did the sexual-
abuse evaluation of the daughter, said she believed the allegations.
However, her report has been severely criticized by experts on both
sides of the case as substandard. Keen recently settled out of court
for an estimated $90,000. Another evaluation was conducted by Roger
Wolfe of Northwest Treatment Associates who concluded that there was
no indication the defendant was a sexual abuser.
  CPS referred the case to Seattle police for investigation and
forwarded Keen's report but the police did not receive the report from
Wolfe. Later in 1994 at the time of a custody battle, a court-
appointed evaluator, concluded there was no indication that the father
was a child sexual abuser. Defendant then regained full visitation
rights and the police closed their case against him.
  The actions of CPS and two caseworkers were found to be negligent.
Several jurors suggested after the verdict that the overall impression
they got from the evidence was that CPS had failed in almost every
aspect of the investigation.
  Assistant Attorney General Peter Berney said the state plans to
appeal the ruling.

  STATE OF CALIFORNIA v. FRANKLIN.  In a brief hearing 5/31/96, San
Mateo County Judge John Schwartz moved the re-trial date from Sept. 16
to Oct. 7 because of scheduling conflicts. The trial of George
Franklin in the murder of a child 20 years earlier hinges on the
testimony of his daughter, Eileen Franklin-Lipsker. Eileen claimed
she had repressed the memory of the incident until she recalled it
many years later.
  Testimony at a second hearing, 6/14/96, may lead to the case being
thrown out, according to Dennis Riordan, George Franklin's
attorney. At that hearing, Janice Franklin, Eileen's sister,
contradicted Eileen's claim that she had never been hypnotized. Janice
Franklin said that she herself had been hypnotized by a therapist in
1989 and was later told by her sister and the therapist that Eileen
had been hypnotized as well. Janice said that she had lied about this
at the 1990 trial and originally refused to testify at the hearing
last week. She took the stand only after she was granted immunity from
prosecution in connection with possible perjury charges. California
case law finds testimony by a previously hypnotized witness to be
inadmissible, because hypnotically enhanced memories are unreliable
and create a false sense of certainty that makes effective
cross-examination of the witness impossible.
  According to the San Francisco Chronicle, 6/18/96, San Mateo Deputy
District Attorney Elaine Tipton refused to comment on how the
testimony could affect the case. She said Janet and Eileen apparently
had had a falling out, which could have led to the testimony.

  WENATCHEE SITUATION: A 13 year-old girl, identified in court
documents by her initials, M.E., recently stated that she lied about
being sexually abused. She had testified in four sex abuse trials and
her allegations of abuse were instrumental in an investigation of the
so-called Wenatchee sex ring investigation which led to 14 guilty
pleas and 5 convictions.
  On June 6, she told the Associated Press she had never been
molested. She said she lied initially because at least two CPS
caseworkers and Wenatchee police Detective Bob Perez, the lead
investigator who later became her foster father, pressured her to do
so. The pressure to keep lying continued, she said, including sessions
before she testified.
  The girl's recanting of her earlier statements may open up
possibilities of appeal for the people convicted in the trials where
she testified. However, the burden will be on the defense to prove
that the recantation is the truth, according to John Myers, a law
professor in Sacramento, Calif, specializing in evidence issues in
child abuse cases. "It's not easy to prove," Myers said.  "Generally,
courts tend to be very reluctant to set aside a verdict on the basis
of recanted testimony."
  According to The Wenatchee World, 6/5/96, M.E. was taken back into
the custody of Children's Services within days after she recanted her
earlier allegations. State officials said that they were acting in
her best interests by removing her from her grandmother's care and
placing her in a group home out of the area. A Douglas County
sheriff's deputy refused to allow M.E.'s grandmother to accompany her.

  A Seattle Times editorial, 6/12/96, reported that the citizens of
Wenatchee may be forced to pay for the claims against the city and its
agents due to the sex abuse investigations. Civil suits and other
claims may reach over $90 million, a figure which is beyond the city's
insurance capacity. Late in May 1996, the Wenatchee city commission
decided that it may assess its property owners 75 cents per $1,000 of
property valuation until any difference between what the city's
insurance company will pay and the anticipated settlements and awards
is made up.

  PAUL INGRAM APPEAL: The Washington State pardons board which advises
Governor Mike Lowry held a hearing on whether to grant Paul Ingram a
pardon.  Paul Ingram, a former Thurston County deputy sheriff, has
served 8 of his 20-year sentence after he confessed to raping his
daughters during nightmarish satanic rituals -- crimes he now says
never happened. Anita Peterson, chairwoman of the pardons board, said
the panel will not decide until its next meeting on Sept. 6 whether to
pardon the former deputy. Gov. Mike Lowry, the ultimate arbiter of
Ingram's fate, won't make any determination until the board issues a
final ruling.
  Testifying at the hearing were Elizabeth Loftus, PhD, Richard Ofshe,
PhD, and Lawrence Wright who had chronicled the Ingram case after
conducting interviews of all parties. Thurston County Prosecutor Gary
Tabor, Thurston County Sheriff Gary Edwards and Ingram's son, Chad
Ingram also testified. Articles in the Seattle Times, 6/6/96, 6/8/96,
summarize the testimony presented at the hearing.

  AMIRAULT APPEAL: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is
scheduled to consider the appeal of Gerald Amirault's conviction early
in the Fall of 1996.  Amirault was sentenced in 1986 to 30-40 years
for atrocious sex crimes allegedly committed in concert with his
elderly mother and his sister against children in the family-run Fells
Acres Day School. His now 72-year-old mother, Violet Amirault, and his
sister Cheryl were released after eight years in prison when their
conviction was overturned. The state is currently appealing the
reversal of their conviction. A review of this case by Dorothy
Rabinowitz was recently published in The Wall Street Journal, May 15,

Independent, 4/29/96): Gary Wayne Mogensen was released from prison
3/19/96 after a dramatic hearing in Santa Maria Superior Court, due to
newly discovered evidence supporting the defendant's assertions of
innocence. Mogensen had served 10 years of a 24-year sentence for his
1985 conviction on charges that he sexually abused his then 9-year-old
daughter. The girl, now 20, recanted her testimony and a continuous
effort was made to free Mogensen.
  An intensive investigation by the Sheriff's Department indicated
that testimony by Dr. William Gordon, a child molestation expert and
physician, was false and photographs supporting Mogensen's innocence
were withheld by Gordon.  As a result, more than 100 cases in which
Dr. Gordon testified are being reviewed.

/                                                                    \
| When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall |
| one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.      |
|                                                       Edmund Burke |
|    Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontent Vol. i. p. 526. |

                          MAKE A DIFFERENCE

  This is a column that will let you know what people are doing to
  counteract the harm done by FMS. Remember that three and a half
  years ago, FMSF didn't exist. A group of 50 or so people found each
  other and today more than 17,000 have reported similar experiences.
  Together we have made a difference. How did this happen?

CALIFORNIA: Families have renewed efforts to encourage book stores to
carry books on FMS and related topics. First they contact the book
store and ask for the manager's hours. When they arrive, they give the
manager an FMS brochure, a Frequently Asked Questions brochure and an
FMS bibliography. They point out the ever increasing number of books
on FMS, the wide range of disciplines involved and suggest that the
bookstore carry some.
  So far they have been well received. Remember, they can also offer
professionally done book displays from SIRS if the bookstore includes
Confabulations, True Stories of False Memories, Survivor Psychology or
Victims of Memory.

MISSOURI: A Wisconsin member reminds us that summertime brings school
and family reunions. If you have the courage, take some FMSF brochures
with you and when you tell your story to an old classmate or relative
-- give them some information. Who knows -- they might just have been
accused themselves.

NEW YORK: Families continue to monitor local medical centers and check
to see if any topic pertaining to FMS is being presented. They attend
and identify themselves if the occasion presents itself.

OREGON: Inspired by the Missouri report of a hypnotherapist who was
arrested for letting clients believe that she was a psychologist, an
Oregon member wrote to tell us that after checking the laws that
govern professionals, he had called the attention of his state
licensing board to individuals who appear to be misrepresenting their
credentials in advertisements.

  Send your ideas to Katie Spanuello c/o FMSF.

/                                                                    \
| FREE LIBRARY DISPLAYS are now available through SIRS Publishers.   |
| Call 1-800-232-7477. This is an attractive and positive way to     |
| inform people about the many new books that are now available      |
| about false memories and the devastating effects this is having on |
| families.                                                          |

                           FROM OUR READERS

To the Board of Medical Examiners:
  I am a parent falsely accused of inflicting sexual and satanic
ritual abuse on my daughter who says that she repressed it for over 30
years. However, under the care of her therapist, she has been able to
recall horrible memories of abuse and accuse her family of being
responsible. Not understanding the accusations or knowing what to do,
I have done nothing except to educate myself about repressed memory
therapy and false memory syndrome these past six years. As the years
have passed, the public, the American Medical Association, and the
American Psychological Association have become aware of this
inappropriate therapy within their ranks which destroys families and
  In addition to alerting you, I am also filing a complaint against
one of your practicing psychiatrists... When my daughter first sought
therapy, she was a very depressed young lady with marital problems.
She was desperately looking for some help and some answers. Dr. "G"
took her when she was her most vulnerable and brainwashed her into
believing that she has multiple personality disorder (MPD) caused by
childhood abuse, mainly satanic ritual abuse, inflicted by me and an
intergenerational satanic cult. No one from Dr. G's office ever
contacted me or any of my daughter's family to try to corroborate any
of these "memories" or accusations.
  While in Dr. G's care, my daughter has been unable to work,
attempted to commit suicide, was admitted to the hospital numerous
times, diagnosed with MPD, approved for government disability, and was
advised to separate herself from her family. She has not spoken to her
family in six years and, as far as I can ascertain, still believes
that her family committed those heinous crimes of sexual and satanic
abuse which are all untrue.
  The theory of repressed memory of this type is unsupported by
reliable scientific evidence. The use of this type of therapy by Dr. G
is reckless and dangerous and has caused significant harm to my
daughter and her family. Dr. G has failed to meet recognized medical
standards and ethics. Her diagnosis, care, and treatment have been a
direct cause of harm to her and her family.
                         Letter to My Sister
  I feel I owe you an explanation of why I decided not to host a small
family get-together in my home recently. During the Spring of 1992 I
visited my lawyer on some business and he informed me that there were
some horrible rumors going around town regarding my father and me
being guilty of incest. He also informed me that the rumors were far
reaching and would have a serious impact on my life.  Being labeled
with incest is a charge for which society condemns an individual upon
accusation. This is a small community and I soon found myself being
treated as a leper as old friends and acquaintances began avoiding
me. It was these same rumors and the meanness of them that drove Mom
and Dad out of town.
  After some thought regarding a get-together with you, I became
concerned that I was inviting trouble for myself and the rest of the
family. Based on what I have experienced, how can I be sure that you
will not leave such a gathering only to level new accusations against
us regarding your children? I could not have afforded to be left in
the same room with your children nor even given them a hug.
  My family has suffered many things in addition to the loss of my
sisters. I can only hope that you never intended to cause the damage
to us that you have.  It is my understanding that our sister "E" has
possibly retracted some of her accusations but I am uncertain where
you stand. Even if you were to withdraw the charges of rape and incest
that you recovered with the help of therapy, the permanent scar and
damage to my reputation, to the character of my wife and to the
innocence of my children shall remain.
  It was you who built the wall separating our relationship. I can and
have forgiven but now find myself unable to remove the barrier...that
is something only you can do.
                                                        Your Brother
                       Retraction is a Process
  I caught part of a show about FMSF on television just at the point I
realized that none of the "memories" in therapy were true. At the
time, I was in shock and walking about saying to myself over and over
again, "Oh my God, it didn't happen. What do I do now?" The program
was a Godsend as I didn't know where to go or what to do and there it
was right there on the TV -- Dr. Ofshe and some retractors. I called
Dr. Ofshe and he gave me the number to the Foundation. I called them,
scared, and very afraid as I'd heard the FMS people were perps and
didn't know if I could trust them or not. I wasn't even sure of my
name then because I had changed it so my parents couldn't find
me. When a friendly voice answered, I spilled out what I thought had
happened to me. They gave me support, love and they helped me out of
the shock I was in so I could start to think for myself again. I was
then able to realize even more what was reality and what had not been
reality. I realized what the therapy had been like and I could find
the answers for myself about what had happened to me and my family.
                                                     Debbie David 
                    Letter to My Wife's Therapist
  Justice was poorly served, but the trial and three years of bitter
legal wrangling are over. There were no winners except the lawyers and
the court officials who received gainful if not worthwhile employment
in the process. My wife has primary custody of the children, at least
until they are old enough that the court is required to hear their
views and preferences...
  I believe that my wife went to you in 1989 as a somewhat confused
person who had trouble with close honest relationships, particularly
focusing at that time on her relationship with her mother. As a result
of your therapy, her problems were greatly exacerbated and she went
from a person who had some difficulty with close long-term
relationships to a person unable to maintain any such
relationship. She deserved better. Her family deserved better. The
children and I and my family deserved better.
  You believed that her parents were abusive and her mother and
brother were "in denial." You believed that her father sexually abused
her even though she had no recollections of any such thing prior to
counseling. You believed without any outside corroboration that all
these things and more happened to her and were the cause of her
problems. You said she showed great courage, "The Courage to Heal" in
accepting that these things happened and that her problems resulted
from the actions and influence of those around her. You told her that
she needed to either sever or completely control her relations with
people around her. She was unable to completely control her relations
with any adult family members so all those relations were severed.
  I stood by her through all this -- until she left with the children
and filed for divorce. I believe that your intentions were good but
your judgment crumbled before your devout ignorance, arrogance and
bias. I believe that my wife used you to validate her at the expense
of all those around her. I believe you used her to make yourself feel
good, wise, powerful and helpful. You have done a great disservice to
the profession you tried to practice, to the person you tried to help,
to the family around her and to the God who oversees us all.  I
forgive you for any wrongs done to me, but it is not mine to forgive
you for the wrongs you have done to others.
                                          Ex husband of your patient
                          Surprise Encounter
  I unexpectedly encountered my "abused" daughter in a supermarket
recently.  After the initial surprise of meeting thusly, her
countenance abruptly adjusted from composure to downcast. Such a
familiar pose, as I now recall, from her earliest days when family
associations or circumstances failed to please her...  Though I felt
certain she intended to stonily pass by me with just "Oh, hi," I
nevertheless managed to greet her similarly and elicit a few comments
from her about her teenage son's graduation, to which he's sent me an
invitation. And then we parted. I wanted to touch her, hug her but
...The phony barriers must remain intact for her; she cannot yet bear
to be wrong about something so special that she's erected for herself
-- her chosen, unchanging role as victim.
  So live alone, my daughter. Perhaps someday...
  Why do we parents seem so "stuck" on the seeming necessity, the
desirability even -- of recovering lost equilibrium with estranged
family members?
                                                               A Mom
                      Her Brother Can't Forgive
  After 6 years, our daughter wants to be part of our family
again. About 8 months ago, her favorite cousin came for a long visit
with us. She called our daughter. Our daughter came to our house twice
to visit. We took photos and videos. Periodic phone calls until last
month. She let us know that she wanted to be part of our family
again. Her brother (our son, who has believed and supported us for 6
years) asked her on the phone if she was recanting her stories. She
told him NO, but she wanted to get on with her life and have a
relationship with her family. He told her, that under those
circumstances, he wanted nothing to do with her. She then called us
and told us she still believed her "memories." We told her that we
still believed that she would recover her true childhood memories. We
told her, we too, wanted her back in our family and that we forgave
her for all the pain she had caused in the past 6 years. Her brother
will not speak to her or come with us when we go out to eat.
                                               A Texas Mom and Dad
                           How Do I Start?
  Where do I start? How can I begin to convey to you my personal
struggle that started in January of 1992 and continues today? The
grief, the pain, the sorrow, the tormenting anguish, the emotional
conflict is replayed every day of my life as it did in 1982 when my
son David committed suicide. The only difference is that at age 38 my
oldest son Michael had a complete mental breakdown and through his
therapist's suggestions and her own interpretations of his feelings,
she has convinced him that his father (deceased in 1985) and I
sexually abused him.
  I never knew how a lie would feed upon itself and take on a life of
its own.  My other two adult sons and adult daughter have suffered
terribly. Our family has been torn apart. When my three other adult
children said that they had never been abused, Michael cut them out of
his life. Michael has had no support for his lie. I tried to meet with
Mike and his therapist. I wanted to see him face to face but they
refused to have any contact with me. I am left with the lie just
hanging out there over me.
  Michael tried to take his life in April of this year and he is still
under her therapy. This therapist has taken a very vulnerable,
emotionally ill man and twisted his thinking even more by feeding him
terrible, vicious lies about his parents. She even convinced him that
my parents molested me and that I am in denial!
  We have been on a roller coaster both mentally and economically. My
husband and I are both retired and lost our jobs after major
surgery. We are forced to sell our home. This is only a small token
but please keep sending the newsletter. I would be so lost without
it. The newsletter has helped me stay sane. Knowing I am not alone out
here means so much.  Thank you.
       A Mom
     A Response to FMSF Program on Appropriate Standards of Care,
                         Philadelphia 5/17/96
  Some therapists are surely some part of the problem, but most of us
are very interested in honest, nonjudgmental information and
approaches to dealing with this problematic issue...[M]ost of us do
build support structures for our clients. Most of us empower our
clients. Most of us are very angry with therapists who over-influence,
dominate, create falsehoods, and encourage clients to cut off from
their families; these are bad actions by any school-of-therapy
  What I want from FMSF is a solid ground from which therapists can
work on setting standards and directions for this problematic area, to
look toward the future when these standards might become learning
modules to educate therapists and graduate students. I also look to
FMSF for leadership in healing the many wounded families, clients, and
therapists who have been caught up in some psychological and
sociological falsehoods. Our FMSF community should be vigilant against
blame of the other. Positive change never comes from blame. 
                      Ellen Starr, ACSW, BCD Licensed Social Worker
                            True Feelings
  My accusing daughter came to share her joy of having a new
grandson. My other daughter and I drove her around to see family
members that she had not seen in four years -- since her accusation of
August, 1992. I must say that I was nearly sick by the time they flew
home. All of the family greeted her warmly and good conversations were
had, and I would not have wanted it any other way; but as everyone
played "Let's Pretend," I began to feel like the outsider, the one who
was at fault in this ripping apart of my whole family. I'm sure no one
thinks that, but it is how my feelings were in spite of my trying to
show her that I still loved her.
                                                              A Mom
                           Rejoice with Us
  Please rejoice with us! Our daughter has returned after a three and
a half year separation. She recently moved with her husband out of
state due to employment. She called before Mother's Day to say, 'I'm
coming, mom, to help celebrate Mother's Day!' My heart leaped with
joy, as did her dad's. We had a most beautiful celebration. How
thankful we are. To those that are waiting still, we say "Don't give
up hope."
                                                  A Happy Mom and Dad
/                                                                    \ 
|                           Before Therapy                           |
| 4 April 1994                                                       |
| Dear Mom and Dad,                                                  |
|    A mere thank you does not seem adequate for everything you have |
| done for us. We are so excited about the baby furniture and are    |
| greatly appreciative to receive it. Your love and just being there |
| has helped us through some scary times. Out little baby will soon  |
| be here and you know how impatient I am. You two need to be        |
| deciding what you want to be called. Thank you for everything.     |
|                                                      Lots of love  |
|                                                                    |
|                           After Therapy                            |
| Nov 6, 1994                                                        |
| Dear Mom and Dad,                                                  |
|   This is extremely painful and difficult to express but it must   |
| be said. I am struggling with many different issues in my life and |
| in order for me to work through these I will be unable to have any |
| contact with my family. I realize that you may not understand but  |
| I can not share anything about these difficulties at this time. I  |
| have no idea how long I will need, but I will contact you when I   |
| am able to talk with you.                                          |
|                                                      Your daughter |

                    JULY/AUGUST 1996 FMSF MEETINGS
  (MO) = monthly; (bi-MO) = bi-monthly; (*) = see State Meetings list


  Sunday, July 28, 1pm
   Nickie (317) 471-0922
    fax (317) 334-9839
  Pat (219) 482-2847

  Saturday, August 3, 9am-2:20pm
  Ft. Snelling Officers Club
  St. Paul, MN
    Dan or Joan (612) 631-2247

  Saturday, August 3, 1-4pm
  Southwest Room, Presbyterian Hospital
  Albuquerque, NM
   Maggie (505) 662-7521 after 6pm

  Saturday, September 28, 10-3pm
  Bonanza Steak House, Weston, WV
  SPEAKER: Claudette Wassil-Grimm
    author of Diagnosis for Disaster
  Pat (304) 291-6448


ARIZONA - (bi-MO) 
  Barbara (602) 924-0975; 854-0404(fax) 

  Al & Lela (501) 363-4368  

  Northern California 
      Joanne & Gerald (916) 933-3655 or
      Rudy (916)443-4041 
      Gideon (415) 389-0254 or 
      Charles 984-6626(am);435-9618(pm) 
    EAST BAY AREA  (bi-MO) 
      Judy (510) 254-2605 
    SOUTH BAY AREA  Last Sat. (bi-MO) 
      Jack & Pat (408) 425-1430 
      Carole (805) 967-8058 
  Southern California 
    CENT. ORANGE CNTY. 1st Fri. (MO) @7pm 
      Chris & Alan (714) 733-2925
    ORANGE COUNTY -3rd Sun. (MO) @6pm
      Jerry & Eileen (714) 494-9704 
    COVINA AREA -1st Mon. (MO) @7:30pm
      Floyd & Libby (818) 330-2321 
    SOUTH BAY AREA -3rd Sat  (bi-MO) @10am
      Cecilia (310) 545-6064  

  DENVER-4th Sat. (MO) @1pm
    Ruth (303) 757-3622 

    Earl 329-8365 or Paul 458-9173 

    Madeline (305) 966-4FMS
  BOCA/DELRAY 2nd&4th Thurs(MO) @1pm 
    Helen (407) 498-8684 
    Bob & Janet (813) 856-7091

ILLINOIS -  3nd Sun. (MO) 
    Eileen (847) 985-7693
    Bill & Gayle (815) 467-6041
    (309) 674-2767

   Nickie (317)471-0922(ph); 334-9839(fax)
   Pat (219) 482-2847 (*) 

  DES MOINES -  2nd Sat. (MO) @11:30am Lunch 
    Betty & Gayle (515) 270-6976 

    Leslie (913) 235-0602 or
    Pat 738-4840 Jan (816) 931-1340  

    Dixie (606) 356-9309 
  LOUISVILLE- Last Sun. (MO) @2pm 
    Bob (502) 957-2378 

  Francine (318) 457-2022  

MAINE - Area Code 207
    Irvine & Arlene 942-8473 
  FREEPORT -4rd Sun. (MO) 
    Carolyn 364-8891

    Margie (410) 750-8694  

  CHELMSFORD- Ron (508) 250-9756  

    Catherine (616) 363-1354 
    Nancy (810) 642-8077 

  Terry & Collette (507) 642-3630 
  Dan & Joan (612) 631-2247 

  KANSAS CITY 2nd Sun. (MO) 
    Leslie (913) 235-0602 or
    Pat 738-4840
    Jan (816) 931-1340 
  ST. LOUIS AREA-3rd Sun. (MO)- AREA CODE 314
     Karen 432-8789 or
     Mae 837-1976 
  SPRINGFIELD - 4th Sat. (MO) @12:30pm 
    Dorothy & Pete (417) 882-1821
    Howard (417) 865-6097  


  Maggie 662-7521 (after 6:30pm) or
  Martha 624-0225  

    Barbara (914) 761-3627 (bi-MO) 
    Elaine (518) 399-5749 
     George & Eileen (716) 586-7942  

    Len 364-4063
    Dee 942-0531
    HJ 755-3816 
    Rosemary 439-2459  

    Paul & Betty (717) 691-7660 
    Rick & Renee (412) 563-5616 
   Jim & Jo (610) 783-0396  
   July & Aug -no mtg 

TENNESSEE - Wed. (MO) @1pm
  Kate (615) 665-1160

    Nancy & Jim (512) 478-8395 
    Jo or Beverly (713) 464-8970 

  Keith (801) 467-0669  

  Judith (802) 229-5154  

   Sue (703) 273-2343  

  Pat (304) 291-6448

  Katie & Leo (414) 476-0285


  VANCOUVER & MAINLAND  Last Sat. (MO) @1-4pm 
    Ruth (604) 925-1539
  VICTORIA & VANCOUVER ISLAND 3rd Tues. (MO) @7:30pm
    John (604) 721-3219

  LONDON -2nd Sun (bi-MO)
    Adrian (519) 471-6338 
    Eileen (613) 836-3294 
    Pat (416) 444-9078 
    Ethel (705) 924-3546 
    Ken & Marina (905) 637-6030 
    Paula (705) 692-0600  

    Alain (514) 335-0863  

  Mrs Irene Curtis P.O. Box 630, 
  Sunbury, VCT 3419 phone (03) 9740 6930  

  fax-(972) 2-259282 or  E-mail-  

    Mrs. Anna deJong (31) 20-693-5692 

  Mrs. Colleen Waugh (09) 416-7443 

    Roger Scotford (44) 1225 868-682  

SEPTEMBER '96 Issue Deadline: Aug 15 Meeting notices MUST be in
writing. Mark Fax or envelope: "Attn: Meeting Notice" & send 2 months
before scheduled meeting.

NEWSLETTER. If you are interested in becoming a contact, write: 

/                                                                    \
|          Do you have access to e-mail?  Send a message to          |
|                                         |
| if  you wish to receive electronic versions of this newsletter and |
| notices of radio and television  broadcasts  about  FMS.  All  the |
| message need say is "add to the FMS-News". You'll also learn about |
| joining  the  FMS-Research list  (it distributes reseach materials |
| such as news stories, court decisions and research  articles).  It |
| would be useful, but not necessary, if you add your full name (all |
| addresses and names will remain strictly confidential).            |

  The False Memory Syndrome Foundation is a qualified 501(c)3 corpora-
tion  with  its  principal offices in Philadelphia and governed by its 
Board of Directors.  While it encourages participation by its  members
in  its  activities,  it must be understood that the Foundation has no 
affiliates and that no other organization or person is  authorized  to
speak for the Foundation without the prior written approval of the Ex-
ecutive Director. All membership dues and contributions to the Founda-
tion must be forwarded to the Foundation for its disposition.

3401 Market Street suite 130,  Philadelphia, PA 19104,  (215-387-1865)

This address and the phone numbers have changed as of July 15, 2000

Pamela Freyd, Ph.D.,  Executive Director

FMSF Scientific and Professional  Advisory Board,       July 1,  1996: 
AARON T. BECK, M.D., D.M.S., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
PA;  TERENCE W.  CAMPBELL,  Ph.D.,  Clinical and Forensic  Psychology,
Sterling Heights,  MI; ROSALIND CARTWRIGHT,  Ph.D., Rush  Presbyterian
St. Lukes Medical Center, Chicago, IL; JEAN CHAPMAN, Ph.D., University
of   Wisconsin, Madison,  WI;    LOREN CHAPMAN,  Ph.D.,  University of
Wisconsin, Madison, WI;    FREDERICK C.  CREWS,   Ph.D., University of
California, Berkeley,   CA; ROBYN M.    DAWES,  Ph.D., Carnegie Mellon
University,  Pittsburgh,  PA; DAVID F.   DINGES,  Ph.D., University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; HENRY C.   ELLIS, Ph.D., University of
New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM; GEORGE K. GANAWAY, M.D., Emory University
of Medicine, Atlanta,  GA; MARTIN GARDNER, Author,  Hendersonville, NC
ROCHEL GELMAN, Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles, CA; HENRY
GLEITMAN, Ph.D., University   of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,  PA; LILA
GLEITMAN, Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA; RICHARD
GREEN, M.D., J.D., Charing Cross  Hospital, London; DAVID A. HALPERIN,
M.D., Mount Sinai School  of Medicine, New  York, NY; ERNEST  HILGARD,
Ph.D., Stanford  University, Palo Alto, CA;   JOHN HOCHMAN, M.D., UCLA
Medical School, Los Angeles, CA; DAVID S. HOLMES, Ph.D., University of
Kansas, Lawrence, KS; PHILIP  S.  HOLZMAN, Ph.D., Harvard  University,
Cambridge,   MA; ROBERT A.  KARLIN,  Ph.D.   , Rutgers University, New
Brunswick,  NJ;   HAROLD  LIEF,  M.D.,  University    of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, PA; ELIZABETH  LOFTUS, Ph.D., University  of Washington,
Seattle,   WA; SUSAN L.   McELROY,  M.D.   , University of Cincinnati,
Cincinnati,   OH;  PAUL    McHUGH,  M.D.,   Johns  Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD;  HAROLD  MERSKEY, D.M., University  of Western Ontario,
London, Canada;  SPENCER  HARRIS  MORFIT, Author, Boxboro,   MA; ULRIC
NEISSER, Ph.D.,  Emory University, Atlanta,  GA; RICHARD OFSHE, Ph.D.,
University  of  California, Berkeley,  CA;   EMILY CAROTA ORNE,  B.A.,
University  of Pennsylvania,   Philadelphia, PA;  MARTIN  ORNE,  M.D.,
Ph.D., University  of Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia, PA; LOREN PANKRATZ,
Ph.D.,   Oregon  Health Sciences  University,  Portland,  OR; CAMPBELL
PERRY,  Ph.D.,  Concordia   University, Montreal,  Canada;  MICHAEL A.
PERSINGER, Ph.D.,  Laurentian University,  Ontario, Canada;  AUGUST T.
PIPER, Jr.,   M.D., Seattle, WA;  HARRISON   POPE, Jr.,  M.D., Harvard
Medical  School,  Boston,  MA;  JAMES   RANDI,  Author and   Magician,
Plantation,   FL; HENRY L.    ROEDIGER,  III, Ph.D.  ,Rice University,
Houston,  TX; CAROLYN  SAARI, Ph.D., Loyola   University, Chicago, IL;
THEODORE   SARBIN, Ph.D., University of    California, Santa Cruz, CA;
THOMAS A.  SEBEOK, Ph.D., Indiana University, Bloomington, IN; MICHAEL
A.    SIMPSON,  M.R.C.S.,   L.R.C.P.,   M.R.C,   D.O.M., Center    for
Psychosocial &   Traumatic Stress,  Pretoria, South   Africa; MARGARET
SINGER, Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, CA; RALPH SLOVENKO,
J.D.,  Ph.D., Wayne State University   Law School, Detroit, MI; DONALD
SPENCE, Ph.D.,  Robert Wood  Johnson  Medical Center,  Piscataway, NJ;
JEFFREY VICTOR,  Ph.D.,  Jamestown Community  College, Jamestown,  NY;
HOLLIDA   WAKEFIELD,  M.A.,   Institute   of Psychological  Therapies,
Northfield, MN; CHARLES A. WEAVER, III, Ph.D. Baylor University, Waco,

                           MEMBERSHIP  FORM

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    Annual Dues for professionals ($125.00)              $________

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___Check or Money Order: Payable to FMS FOUNDATION in U.S. dollars.
  Foreign & Canadian payments may only be made with a Credit Card, a 
  U.S. dollar money order, or a check drawn on a U.S. dollar account.


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